Charles Morton

    A Logic System

    The preface to the Reader.

    When I consider the Singular parts and Industry of some persons, and that of either Sex, who have not the Command of Learned Languages, nor have had the opportunity to attain them; methinks I find a compassion stirring in my good nature, and inclineing me to do what I can for them, To Cherish their noble desire of knowledge, and in some measure to give it satisfaction. What pity it is that Reasonable Souls should not be Improved to the utmost; that Ingenious minds should Languish for want of matter to work uppon. Tis true Indeed, they are at present busied but it is for the most part in things below their Souls, and their extensive capacities; and unless Religion or Conscience raise the mind to matters of the highest nature: the witt and Industry of most men is wholly Imployed in purveying for the body, and progging to satisfie its sensuall appetites. mean while there is little or no provision for the noble & high born soul it self: no knowledge for the Intellect to feast upon; no contemplations to be well digested as a nourishment for a solid and growing wisdom!

    My purpose is therefore to translate or compose (as the matter will bear) short systems or breviaries of various kinds of learning in our mother tongue, that so all sorts of the Ingenious may be something more worthy the looking after than what they are generally Imployed about.

    The knowledge and fear of God is indeed the Topp of wisdom; but next under it, and in subordination to it, is good Literature; for hereby men Arrive nearer the Top of Jacob’s Ladder, whose bottom is sett upon the earth, where the Beasts may graze about it; and the upper and in the highest heaven; but the middle hights are for the Angells, and Angelicall souls to Traverse.

    Some that have drudged in books may think that i have prophaned the mysteries of Ceres, and done phylosophy wrong by exposing it to vulgar eyes: others also may Laugh at the undertaking, as a fruitless and Impertinent Labour, Because our Tongue will not express many things without a Tedious circumlocution, or some cramp words that will be as hard to understand as Greek and Latin [if they be not the very same] such as, Genus, Species, prædicable, prædicament, subject, adjunct, homogeneall, heterogeneal, & such like, especially in the art of Logick.

    To all Which I answer. That some of these Gentlemen have so much affected to use such terms in their popular discourses as hath taken of a great deale of their horrour; So that a vulgar eye will not soe terribly be started at them, because their ears have been somewhat acquainted with them. A part of the present designe is to explain the harder phrases whereby such adorn’d discourses may be better understood; and so not yeild an Uncertain sound and become altogether useless. And although the vulgar Tongue cannot so fully express all things, as might be wished; yet it may do it sufficiently to let men see, that there is something considerable in humane Learning; and that Scholars who more fully comprehend those matters, are no such pittifull and contemptible things as now the world does make them.

    Now by the most of men one profitable is valued beyond all the Liberall arts; but hereafter Tis hoped they will account those Liberall, to be of a more noble allay. And if by this means Phylosophy shall obtain a better esteem; then I hope no wrong is done thereto, by showing in some sort what it is to the view of the common people.

    Again it is Well Known that many of the best Learned [such as, Bacon, Digby, Raynolds, Wilkins, Beylo, More, &c] have soe enobled our Language with Phylosophicall discourses, that forreigners are said to have Addicted themselves to our Tongue, for those works sake written therein; being not content with Translations which they Judge (with good Reason) must needs fall short of the originalls.1

    Now supposing that those worthies did this for high & prudent ends, Their examples (in some Measure) may become our warrant. Besides those excellent mens Writings may be better Apprehended by our country men, & so become a more generall, as well esteem, as usefulness. Add to this A profession of any Ignorance, why any man should be secluded from the Investigation of any Truth; Seeing God has made his great works to be sought out of all those that have pleasure therein. [Psalms: 111:2.].

    Nor do I know but that this Little Light hung up in the entry thereof, may Invite some active spirits to trye a farther passage, Into the more secret chambers of Phylosophy: yea may not some be excited to an unwearied and Irrefragable Industry; In getting the more usefull tongues when they perceive their subserviency in those matters: and at Length Arrive unto a perfection [at least] capable of making discreetly some natural experiments, whereby they may light on happy Inventions to the Augmentation of science.

    Not to mention the Noble Emulation that may be stirred hereby to A greater Industry in those, that have had the benefit of a better education: As also the handsomer converse among men, when things rather than persons shall be the subject of their discourse, what is said may I hope suffice to make Apology for this present undertaking, which is professed to have no other ends, then Gods glory and the Generall good of Men.

    The End of the preface.

    Principall Philosophy is the comprehension of all Arts & Sciences so far as by naturall light they can be acquired (i.e.) by teaching, Learning, and Study can be gotten.


    Porphyries Tree3

    Diagram. A. To Chapt. 2.


    Highest Genus Predicamentall—Substance




    Individualls under A Predicament

    Diagram. B. To Chapt. 3.

    Genus and Species in a Right line

    Difference on the Side

    Collateral species with their Differences

    1. 1. Its Distinction, into

      Natural. Men’s common Reason.


    1. 2. Its Definition

      Habitual Logick is An Art of thinking, or an Art directing the mind in the knowledge of things.

      Note, Tis the Instrumentall Phylosophy, and Therefore first Learn’d because a man must be first furnished with Instruments [or books] before he can doe any works.

    2. 3. Its Object [or matter which it treats of] are terms of Art (i.e) Artificiall new names given to things.—besides the proper & grammaticall words. See.*

    *Animal. cald genus.—



    1. ¶ Because terms are not so much the outward words as the Inward conceptions therefore they are called Notions. and because formed in the mind after the proper or first Notions therefore cald Second Notions.
    2. ¶ Those terms have no being but (objective only) in the understanding; therefore are no longer then they are thought of. Any real Being that I think of is (objective) in my understanding; but not (objective only) for it may have a being when I think not of it.
    3. ¶ Every Art hath its proper terms which A man utterly unacquainted with that art, understandeth not. Such A man being asked What is this? would Answer in the First notions, as what the Artist would call [A Hammer] he would call [a peice of Iron fastened to a stick]7 [A mallet] (a small longer stick fastened to a short thicker one) [A Cheezel] an (Iron broad and thin at one end, with a thicker peice of wood fastened to the other) &c.
    4. ¶ This is enlarged on to show why Logick gives new names to things that they may be more distinctly & easily understood, that as the Artist calls for his tools by the Artificial name: so the mind may Recall her notions, & order them easily by the help of those terms, & therefore these new hard words are not useless & Impertinent.

    Terms are as handles fixed to a thing:

    usefull; as bonds that flesh to market bring

    1. 4. Its end, is to direct the understanding [as moral habits regulate the will) Note understanding (or Intellect) & will are two cheif faculties in man wherby he is distinquished from a brute.
    2. 5. Its parts, are 2 answerable by the 3 acts of the Intellect
      1. 1. Apprehension is of simple terms, that is such as represent one thing to the mind. & they are imary or 2dary.
        1. 1. Primary Simple term, is when one word or notion express one thing. As Animal, Man, Learned (in the first notions) or Genus, Species, Accident (in the 2d notions).
        2. 2. Secondary, or raised from the former, is when more words or notions signifie. But one thing, (as a Reasonable Animal) signifies (a man) or (in 2d notions) a (Genus with its difference) signifies the (species) and this is done in Definition, or (an Animal Rational or Irrational) Represents a Distributive notion of an Animal to my thoughts in division.
      2. 2. Composition, is the joyning more simple terms together in a sentence by the verb substantive (is) either

        as a Man is a Rational Animal or Species is a genus with its difference. As Socrates walks, that is, Socrates is walking.

        ¶ the 2d part of Log. directs this act by Proposition.

      3. 3. Discourse or Ratiocination, (not External in words, but Internal in thoughts).
        1. 1. Illative (or Inferentiall) which draws (or Inferrs) one proposition (as a conclusion) from one or more (as promises) in Syllogism.
        2. 2. Ordinative (or methodicall) which Rightly disposes the parts of a Discipline, In Method.

    Logic by its 3 parts dos the Intellect.

    to (Apprehend, compound, discourse) direct.

    Synopsis Cap. 1 of Logick

    Cap. 2. of Predicables.8

    Predicables are such as are apt to be spoken (that is affirmed or denyd) of things and that either

    1. 1. Individuall (or singular) is that which is under the lowest Species, and can be no further divided into compleck things tho it may into parts of a thing.

      ¶ Animal [the Genus] can be divided into man and brute, [the five species thereof] man the species may be divided into all singular men as Socrates, Plato, Arist. occ. But one of those being Individuall can be no farther splitt unless into parts & peices (as body, soul, head, hands, &c.) Indeed the same name as (John) may be attributed to divers singular men (as John Rogers, John Roberts &c.) but neither of those Johns (the thing or person) can be divided or Attributed to any other person in the world.

      ¶ All things existent in the world are Individualls. Genus and Species may have essence and being, and may have somewhat affirmed or denyed of them, as an Animal is sensible. A man is not a stone But nothing hath existence or actuation of being out of its causes but a singular, for man were not to be found were it not for John, Tom, William, or some other person or Individuall:

    A Single one or Individuall! What,

    Indefin’d Proper, Suppos’d pointed at

    1. 2. Universalls are apt to be predicated of more than one, that is may Answer to Questions

    1. As what is man? An Animal (genus) What is Socrates? A man (species) what kind of Animal is man? A Rational (difference) or speaking Animal (property) or what kind of man is Socrates? Learned (Accident)
    2. ¶ properties do primarily belong to the Genus or species because they are Inseparable from the whole kind, but Accidents are variable and therefore cheifly are predicated of and ascribed to Individualls.
    3. ¶ that speech is said to be a property of man because by outward articulate sounds it signifies the inward Thoughts, therefore A parrot which knows not what he says doth not speak but only Imitate words and sounds.
    4. ¶ some will have properties to be essentiall not Accidentall and then they thus distribute the universalls as Predicables

    1. 1. Genus or Generall kind is that which is predicated of more species. As Animal of Man or Brute, for if I ask what is man? you may Rightly answer an Animal. And so what is a brute an Animal,

    1. ¶ Highest Genus is above all and can never be a species. Lowest species is below all (next the Individuall) and can never be a Genus.
    2. Subalternates are between both and are both
    3. ¶ Genus hath two or more species under it.

    1. 2. Species or speciall kind is that which is under a Genus, or rather that which is predicable of more Individual’s, as man of John, Tom, William &c.

      ¶ Predicable, that is apt to be predicated though actually it be not, for the nature of a species may be conserved in one Individuall. So man was a species when only Adam was created. So the sun or moon &c. are species thô there be but one Individuall of their kind, for if there were many more they might be all called Sun and Moon.

    Genus above, Species below are seen.—

    and Subalternates take their place between

    1. 3. Difference is that which answers essentially to the question (what sort kind or manner) as what sort of Animal is man? Rational (that is the difference)

    The offices of Difference are.

    1. 1. To divide the genus into species: so Rational splitts Animal into man and brute; for the animal that is Rational that is man; not Rational is brute: in this respect difference is called divisive.
    2. 2. To constitute the species [together with the Genus] so animality & Rationality do essentially constitute a Man, and so it is call’d constitutive.

      ¶ That as Diff. is cald constitutive, because ’tis an essentiall part, so property (thô some will have it to be essentiall too) yet is said to be consecutive or following not makeing the nature of the thing. So Risibility (or power of Laughing) or the power of Speech, do follow upon Reason, but Reason which is the difference makes the man.

    Genus and difference do the species make

    Properties after difference place do take

    1. 4. Property is predicated as the Diff. of the Species, but consecutive and in a secondary order to Diff. (as was said) they are of 4 sorts.
      1. 1. only not all, as to be a Physitian, only of the species of man not of every Individuall man.
      2. 2. All not only, as to have two leggs. of man all naturally, but not only, for birds have so, this is the meanest property, for property naturally Imports only, it may therefore be called a community Rather than a Property.
      3. 3. All and only, not always, as the venerable hoary head of man, but not in youth.
      4. 4. All, only, and always, as the power of Laughing & Speaking of man. This is the cheif property and ’tis here especially meant, for the other 3 may be Accounted common accidents.

    1. ¶ That the power of speaking belongs to all men (Tho Infants and dumb persons can’t actually speak)
    2. Because ’tis a Perfection due to the humane nature. & therfore such persons are said to have the power of speaking in the first act thô not in the second, and so seeing is ascribed to a blind Animal, because sight is the perfection of the Animal nature.

    1. ¶ Convertible is when the predication will turn with an all, as all men speak, & all that speaks is a man.
    2. ¶ They are also said to be necessary to the subject because they are due to the naturall perfections of that thing whereof they are properties.
    3. 5. Accident is predicated as property, but contingently, not necessary, or convertible, so Learning of a man. Whiteness of a wall. &c. they are of 2 sorts.
      1. 1. Inseparable (by mans hand or art) as blackness from A crow
      2. 2. Separable (by mans hand or art) as whiteness from A wall. All Accidents are separable by our thought.

        ¶ Separation by thoughts (or mental) is called Abstraction. Which is twofold:

        1. 1. Precisive is when we can think of one thing without thinking of the other: Thus I can abstract cheife properties, as I can think of A man without thinking of the power of his speech, but that I cannot do what the Diff. Rationality: for that is Implied and Included in the formall conception of man.
        2. 2. Negative when I can deny the thing In my mind or suppose the contrary without any contradiction or Absurdity (thô perhaps it cannot be without falshood) See common Accidents (thô Inseparable actually or manually) yet may mentally be Abstracted; Thus I can think or say (the Crow is white) and yet not think or speak a contradiction (Thô a falshood) for blackness thô it be truly in a Crow is not essentiall to it: for it might be a crow thô it were not black. Soe I can think away thô not wash away the redness of a brick for it might be a brick thô it were not red. But now I cannot say of a property [man is not Risible] without A contradiction and absurdity because this is an essentiall and necessary property of man. Essentiall consecutive [as property] thô not essentiall constitutive [as Diff] as is before noted.

    1. ¶ Therefore Diff. can no ways be separated & abstracted, properties can be abstracted precisively not negatively. Inseparable Accidents may be abstracted negatively. Separable Accidents may not only mentally but actually or manually be taken quite away.

    Abstraction precisive takes property

    All common Accidents I can deny.—

    Synopsis. Cap. 2.

    Cap. 3. Of Antepredicaments.

    Antepredicaments are somethings needfull to be foreknown (by way of preface) for the better understanding the predicaments. There are Definitions, Divisions, and Rules.

    1. 1. Definitions 3. Æquivocalls, univocalls, & Denominatives.
    2. 2. Divisions. 2. of words, and things.
    3. 3. Rules. 2. of things under the same common Genus, & things not seen.
    1. 1. Definitions 3.
      1. 1. Æquivocalls are where the name is the same but the Reason of that name is different; so dog is an Æquivocall name; of the barking Animal ’tis the natural name, of the dog fish, and of the dog starr a borrowed name: for ’tis not cald dog. Because tis a barker but because ’tis a constellation so painted on the globe, of the fish (not as barker neither, but) because it hunts fishes as dogs do beasts.

        ¶ All figurative speeches are Æquivocalls So christ is a door, way, vine &c.

        ¶ you cannot understand the truth or falshood of a sentence before you know in what sense the words are taken, therfore the Logicall Rule is first distinguish of words, before you define or determine of things.

      2. 2. Univocalls are where is the same name & reason of the name or common nature. So Animal is the common name of man and beast, for the same Reason Bec: both are sensible Living creatures (which is the nature of an Animal)

    1. Analogicalls have the same name & nature (as univocalls) but not Equally & depending one of the other. So being it is a Common name for Substance & Accident, but substance hath more of being then Accidents. & Accident would have no being but as depending on substance. so God and Creature are both said to be beings.
    2. 3. Denominatives are when words are of a like signification and are derived one of the other, as Justice, Just, Justly. Three things belong to

    1. ¶ By form is meant any predicable (in what sort soever) Whether it be difference, property, or Accident, for a man may be denominated Rational from Rationality (the Diff.) risible from risibility (the property) White from whiteness (the common Accident).
    2. ¶ Just is said to be an Aggregate both of subject & form, because it is an Adjective, now adjectives in Grammar are never said to stand alone, and therefore they always suppose some substantive thô not expressed, such as man, thing, &c. So when one saith Just, he is understood to mean a Just man, a good, a good thing.

    1. 2. Divisions 2. of things and of words.

    Great Aristotle all created things

    under 2 common heads (sub, Acci) brings

    1. 1. Substance is that wherein Accident inheres, as man in whom is Learning, virtue, honesty, &c.
    2. 2. Accident is that which Inheres in a Substance, as Learning, honesty, &c.

      ¶ To Inhere is to be in, not as part (as the branch abides in the vine) nor locally (as wine in the Glass) but so as it cannot be unless it be in, as Learning cannot have a being unless it be in some man: whereas the branch or the wine might be the same, thô they are removed from the vine or glass.

      Accident’s being is in being.

    In not as part nor place nor can absent

    that does inhere and is an Accident.

    1. ¶ Thô Accidents can be absent from substances without their destruction, yet they cannot be without their own; therefore take an Accident Individuall (as this blackness) from its Individuall subject (this paper) one without it cease to be.
    2. ¶ And from this it follows that no Individuall Accident can shift subjects, or pass from one subject to another, therfore when whiteness comes of from the wall on my cloathe; ’tis not the whiteness separated from its subject, but part of the lime which is its subject doth come of with it. and when a blackness seems to be taken of, and put on again upon a Liquor, it is not the same numericall or Individuall blackness that was before but a new produced. This rule is of great use in the controversie of Transubstantiation. For the Papist say that the same Accidents of bread (Colour, tast, smell, figure &c) do pass from the bread to the flesh when the substance is chang’d; but Protestants say ’tis Impossible. Bec. ’tis contrary to the very nature of an Accident.

    1. Abstract is the substantive of an Accident, & consider’d without the consideration of the subject, for I may think of the nature of Wisdom and folly, virtue & vice, &c. without Applying them to any man.
    2. Concrete is the adjective of an Accident and therefore does always Imply a substantive or subject to be joyned with it. as Wise Implies a man as well as Wisdom, or whereas Wisdom signifies it selfe without any consideration of man.
    3. Simple is any word or words (how many soever) that have no verb joyned to make it a sentence, as horse, man, Loved, hated, &c. or a good honest Just man, &c.
    4. Complex is a sentence made by a verb joyn’d to other words. This sentence is cald A proposition which is allways form’d by the verb substantive (is) as is before shown, Cap. 1. Socrates walks, or is walking.

    Abstract—as Justice, concrete is as Just

    Simple—as man, & complex, man is dust.

    1. 3. Rules Antepredicamentall are 2.
      1. 1. 9. whatsoever is predicated (essentially) of the predicate is also predicated of the subject, as in this Proposition [Socrates is a man] Socrates is the subject, man is the essentiall predicate, (or thing affirmed) now whatsoever may be essentially said of the predicate man, may be truly also said of the subject Socrates, as man is an Animal Rational, Risible, &c. and therefore so is Socrates.

    1. 2. Rx. Genus, as that are put subordinately or one under another have the same species and Difference, but not so put have Divers; as substance, body, Liver, Animal, are put one under another, (se Diagram B) all these have the same species: as man which is the next species to Animal is Remote to Substance, body,: &c. these have also the same Diff. for corporeall is the divisive Diff. of substance, & the constitutive Diff. of body, and so of the rest, but if they are so disposed in subordination then have they Divers species & Differences, as subj.

      ¶ the Diagram B of substance (& so it might be of other predicaments) is cald Porphyries tree. To which we shall again have Recourse when we come to the Definition of a Predicament.

    Synopsis. Cap. 3.

    Cap. 4th Of Predicaments in Generall10

    A Predicament is a Troop, or Series, or order of things in their Genus & species Rightly disposed, over and under another, & the Differences on the side: see Porphyries Tree Diagram B.

    All which are comprehended in these two verses

    A man, tall, wise, that once his friend, did Greet

    Buried, In Greece, new, lies, in winding Sheet

    But that it may be directly there are 5 Requisites, namely that it may be

    1. 1. Real being (& not notion) for thô the Predicament, or order be but a notion, yet the matter therein handled & disposed are things & Real beings.
    2. 2. Univocall, bec. the predications of the Genuss & Species are univocall, Equivocals can’t be admitted before they be distinquished & their right sense assertayn’d.
    3. 3. Universalls that is Genuss or Species; for Individuals are under and not in a Predicament.
    4. 4. Whole and compleat, as Man, not a part as head, hand &c. which are not directly, but Reductively in the predicament of their whole.
    5. 5. finite, for infinite are excluded whither they be positive or negative.
      1. 1. Positive, as God, who can have no Genus or common nature with any of his creatures.
      2. 2. Negative, (which may rather be called) Indefinite, than Infinite) as not a man, not a horse &c. now those words signifie nothing certain, & therfore can be referred to no certain order of things.

    To Predicaments five things are Requisite,

    Real, Univ: Univers: Whole, Finite

    Synopsis Cap. 4th

    Cap: 5th Of Substance

    Substance is a being subsisting of it Self and subject to Accidents. Subsisting, with its Diff. of it self not to exclude depending of God, but on other things as Accident dos on Substance. Subject to Accidents is its property, & that of the 4th kind, & of the best with a distinction of Immediate and mediate.

    1. 1. Immediate subject of Accidents may be an Accident, and this sustained by a farther subject.
    2. 2. Mediate and Ultimate which lastly sustains all, and this is only Substance [as the sweetness of honey is delightfull] where delightfulness (an Accident) is Immediately said of and subjected in sweetness (an Accid, too) but mediately of honey (the substance) which doth lastly sustain both the sweetness and delightfulness: much like a chain of divers links that hangs at by one and by a nail fastened to a wall; one link indeed sustains another, but all are held up by the nail. Sub, is divided 2 ways, as subsisting, & as Subject to Accident.


    1. 2. Subjt. to Accident Into first & second.
      1. 1. First substances are Singular or Individuall cald first Bec: primarily Accidents are inherent in them.
      2. 2. Second substances are universalls (genus & species) Bec: they are but 2dary subjects to adjuncts or accidents: for man (the species) is said to be learned Bec: this or that particular man is so; and were there no Individual man learned, Learning could not be ascribed to mankind.

    Canons, Rules, Propositions, or properties of Substance are chiefly 4.

    1. 1. Substance hath no contraries; for contraiety is peculiar to quality, therefore fire and water are said to be contraries, not in respect of the substance but of their contrary qualities, heat and cold.
    2. 2. it hath no degrees (of being) this also belongs to qualities. It may indeed be greater or less, more or less, extension it has, but not Intention. as a tree is not more (that is rather) a substance than a hair, thô it be a greater substance, a hair has as truly and as many Accidents, as a tree.
    3. 3. It admits contraries into it, Remaining still numerically (or Individually) the same. So the same numericall water is hot & cold

    1. ¶ degrees in qualities are accounted 8 in number; one (as of cold) will consist in the same substance with 7 (as of heat) 2 with 6. 2 with 5. &c. but 8. will not admit one of the contrary: therefore 8 are intense degrees and all the rest Remiss.
    2. 4 Second substances and their Differences are univocally predicated of the first substances, as Socrates or Plato (the first substance) is a man (the second substance) is Rationall (its difference).

    Synopsis Cap. 5th

    Cap. 6th Of Quantity

    Quantity is an Acci: (as all the rest that follow are) whereby a subject is said to be extended; that is having one part out of another, extension is either

    1. 1. penetrable is the having parts so out of parts as that it can have them all together in a point of space, or at pleasure can expatiate them to a larger space by this also more things can be in the same space together, therefore this penetration is not such a peircing, as a Gimlet, Borrier or nail pierceth wood; for these only remove the wood out of the way by cutting it of or thrusting it asides. This extension is proper to spirits which may be in the same space wherein bodies or other spirits are without mutual Impediment (Legion for we are many)12 This may be illustrated by Gods universall prescense, whom if body could exclude from any where he were not Infinite (which is contrary to the name of the Deity)
    2. 2. Impenetrable in having parts so out of place as that they can’t be together, nor can any body be in the same space with another be it never so small, therefore as one comes in the other goes out, so as beer comes in the cup the air goes out. &c. This extension is open to bodies & materiall things, & is the extension of Quantity. What dimensions cannot penetrate

    1. 1. continuall whose parts are connected by a common term that is by some Indivisible connecting the divisible parts of Quantity, the species of continuall quantity are 3

      Length, having one dimension

    1. 1. Length (cald line) is only long and hath no breadth or depth; such as are an Inch, span, cubit, yard, mile, &c. its common term is indivisible point, so the middle an{d} end of a line is the common point or term of the 2 halves.

      ¶ Line is a very equivocall word and is used many ways: as for a line printed or written in a book: a small line drawn by a pen; a cord streched out: a boundary. &c. but here ’tis only taken for the bare length of any thing, which therefore is cald its line.

    2. 2. breadth (surface or outer face of a thing) has 2 dimensions, viz, long & broad, (or outward & sidewise) but no depth. Such are board measure, glass measure, land measure: as a feet square, a perch square, An Acre, A hide of land (that is 30 acres) &c.—Its common term is line. which thô divisible according to length, yet not to breadth; for it has no breadth; for it has no breadth and so it is a term.
    3. 3. thickness (called solid, & body-Mathematicall, distinct from body physicall which is in substance) has 3 dimensions, Length (onwards) breadth (sideways) & depth (downwards or upwards). Such are timber measure (cald solid or cubicall) as a foot square of wood which is formed like a die; so a foot square of water Sec. Its common term is surface (as it has no thickness) for if I conceive a body to be divided into 2 parts, I must conceive abroad surface passing thrô it, where that division is made: this conceived surface is the one common term which renders the body continuous before the actual division; but after that division two surfaces do emerge instead of that one; and then the two parts clapped, together will be but continuous (or touching) but not continuous (or whole).

    1. 2. Discrete quantity is number whose parts are not connected, but consist of a multitude of severall unites, the smallest number is 2.

      Number is divided

    1. So when I number my eggs I say 1. 2. 3. which if they were number numbering they would make 6. but in numbers numbered it is but 3 and is no more than 1. 1. & 1.

    Canons of Quantity are 4.

    1. 1. Quantity has no contrary, a straight and crooked line are contrary not as lines, but in respect of their qualities straightness and crookedness.
    2. 2. Quantity has no degrees, is not more and less, thô greater & less.
    3. 3. From Quantity things are said to be equal & unequal; for Equality is when divers things have the same quantity or measure.
    4. 4. Quantity may always be divided or augmented; at least in our thoughts thô not actually, there may be a least Physical (cald Atom) but no least mathematicall, and so may be said of a greatest, for there is nothing so great but; can still think it greatest here that pretty Riddle and seeming contradiction (yet true) you cannot do what you can as for you cannot in your thoughts add to number as much as you can add; for you can still add more, or ask as much money as you can and; I will give it you. The solution is you can’t do Actually what you can Potentially.

      ¶ Thô most men incline to allow this last canon, yet some think that there are on both sides difficulties insoluable about it. one Instance I Remember is this, if a man go a mile by steps, as say, he at first going passes halfway and there stays; and then he begins again and goes half of what was left, and there stops; and so again & again, now the question is if he still proceeds in this order when he shall come to the end & the answer is, never, for he will still have a half before him. but we see men do go to the end of a mile; therfore they do not always go over a half before they go over a whole; and therefore the last half is as big as the last whole (which is absurd) or the last half hath no half nor is further divisible. And yet on the contrary there are many demonstrations, that there is never so little part but it may be still be divided. I shall mention 2 undeniable proofs. Suppose 2 concentricall circles, and a thred fastened at the center (C) the other end streched out to (A) and movable upwards towards (B) now if there be a least point, let the line at (A) be moved towards (B) so much as that conceived least, and it will appear that the line will move less in the inner circle towards (D) and so there is a less than the least (which is absurd) or else there is no least, again suppose 3 of these least indivisibles standing in a row and touching one the other ’tis manifest the 2 outermost must touch that in the middle either in whole or part, if in whole then there is a penetration of dimensions (which is contrary to the nature of Quantity and is absurd), but if it touch in part then it has pii, and so the least has a less (which is absurd) and therefore there is no least.

    Synopsis, cap. 6th

    Cap 7th Of Quality

    Quality is an Acci. whereby the subject is said to operate; as heat whereby the subjective is said to heat, warm, melt, or burn &c. ’tis known also by answering the question (Accidentally) what manner, kind, or sort of? as what kind of man is Socrates? Ans. Honest, wise, learned, &c.

    1. 1. Natural power & Impotens is a quality Implanted by nature to be the next principle of some act. as the power of seeing is the next principle whereby we see [the remote principle is the Animal nature] its Impotens is where the eye is weak and sees badly.

    1. 2. Habit & disposition is a quality superadded to the power whereby it is enabled more easily to act Thus
      1. 1. Infused by God Immediately, as Grace: the art of Bezaliel and aholiab to embroider: the knowledge of the tongues in the Apostles; prophesy &c.13
      2. 2. Acquired by humane Industry, in Teaching and Learning, as Phylosophy, and manuall acts. Acquired are gotten either in
        1. 1. Habit is gotten by many acts (or few valid & Intense) and is not easily removed from its subject.
        2. 2. Disposition is by few acts (or weak and remiss) and is easily Removed. Thus a man having a natural power of Reasoning (which a dog has not) by instruction, study, and exercise getts an habit of Logick; or an Art superadded to the nature of Reasoning, now he that is a beginner & hath made small progress, or he that slightly & superficially minds it, attains but to a Disposition which by disuse he will soon forgett. so in manufactures. &c—habits are either.
          1. 1. moral, subjected in the will enclining to do some moral action, as virtues, vices.
          2. 2. Intellectuall, subjecting in the understanding enclining to assent to some proposition.—the privative of Assent is doubt; ’tis when one hath no Reason to encline to either part: or when in our thought there is equal Reason on both sides, illustrated by a ballance in equilibration, when both scales are empty & both equally filled, hence that rule in doubtfulls tis safest to deny Assent, or, (in practicalls) best not to meddle.

    1. 1. Intelligens is a habit enclining the understanding to assent to principles, that is such generall propositions, that no one with the least pretence of Reason can deny.

      Of such some are

      1. 1. Speculative, as every whole is greater than its part.
      2. 2. Practicall. as God is to be worshipped, do to another as thou wouldest &c.
      3. 3. operative, as believe an Artist in his Trade if sense or Reason contradict not.

    1. The word, doe, is equivocally Applied to both, soe a shoemaker that is dilligent in his calling; but is no good workman: does or lives well; but does or makes ill: whereas a cut purse that is Artificall in his trade, does (as to Moralls) ill; but does (as to art) his work very well:
    2. ¶ A man is said to be an Intelligent man who is well stored with such principles or maxims or at least readily assent to them when he hears them, but if any be so foolish or perverse to deny them, he is to be turned of as a Brute. The Rule is, Against principles one who denys principles there is no disputing.14
    3. 2. Sapience or wisdom enclines to assent to more Generall conclusions from most general principles; as nothing can be and not be at the sometime: Bec: contradictories cannot be both true or every thing is either perfect or Imperfect, bec. contradictories cannot be both false.

      ¶ The difference between Intelligens that assents to principles, and Sapience which draws conclusions from these principles. Such a Sapiens is metaphysicks.

    4. 3. Science or Knowledge enclines to assent unto necessary conclusions by the evidence they have from their next and peculiar causes—As a Table is a wooden materiall therfore it is combustible.

      ¶ The Diff. between Sapiens, whose conclusions are from most generall principles that concern all things, And science which is from more particular principles, and such as Respect the matter in hand.

    5. 4. Prudence assents to practicall or morall conclusions; which concern manners and govern morall actions; as this is just I must do it.
    6. 5. Art assents to conclusions effective or operative. As great materialls can better bear then be born, therefore such must lie low in a building.

      Art is either

    1. ¶ of these 5 Intellectuall habits Sapiens and Science are speculative; prudence, is practicall: Art, is operative: but Intelligence is all three: (viz) speculative, practicall, operative.

    1. 3. Patible quality and passion is equality that is the object of one only sense, as colour to seeing: sound to hearing. &c.
    2. ¶ Passion is not a Passion of the mind—As love, hatred, Anger, &c. nor predicamentall passion as opposed to action; as to be Loved, hated, beaten, &c. but it is a patible suddenly passing away, as as the appearance of a flash of Lightning, the bounce of a gunn, paleness by fear, Redness by Anger &c.

    1. 4 form and figure, those 2 seem rather kindes then degrees (as all the rest are). Their Generall name may be shape and these two the species then of shape is a common object of more senses. Is defined a quality arising from the termination of the parts of Quantity.

    Canons of Quality.

    1. 1. only qualities are contraries, as hot and cold, hard and soft.
    2. 2. only qualities have degrees; Intension, Remission, more or less.
    3. 3. from qualities things are said to be like or dislike, likeness or similitude is where divers things have the same quality; Dissimilitude where diverse, so one egg is like another in colour, figure, &c. but an oyster is unlike an apple.

    Syn: cap. 7.

    Cap: 8th. of Relation

    Relation is an Accident whereby one thing Respects (or is Referred to) another, as fatherhood, sonship, Dominion, Servitude, &c. to every Relation are 3 Requisites


    Species of Rational as between knowledge and the thing knowable.

    Relation are

    Canons of Relation.

    1. 1. Relates are Reciprocable or converted with an (of) as the father is the father of the son; & the son is the son of the father.
    2. 2. Relates are together in nature, that is when 2 things inferr or deny each other, and neither is the cause of the other, so father and son inferr each other, for if there be a father he has a son; and if there be a son he has a father; and so do deny each other and neither is the cause, the father indeed is the cause of the son as a man begetting but not formally as the father; for paternity, or fatherhood is no more the cause of filiation, or sonship, than sonship is of paternity; the man is the cause of the man, but not the Relation of the Relation.
    3. 3. Relates are together in knowledge, for when I know him to be a father I know he has a sonne.
    4. 4. correlates put and Remove each other, that is a correlates are in being, one, more, or none, so are Relations as one man that has 10 sons has to paternity: if 5 dye he has 5 paternities left, if all die he has none; and it may be said he was a father but is not. and so of the son he was a son but is not when his father is dead.

    Syn: cap. 8th

    Cap. 9th Of Action, and Passion

    These two have always their actuall being & existence together, & therefore are so handled.

    1. 1. Action is an Accident whereby the subject is said formally to act or do any thing, or that which dos constitute the subject in the actuall being of an Agent, and therefore denominateth him so.—

    1. ¶ of Immanent is that famous Question debated with Arminians, viz: whether there be any new Immanent act in God? i.e. whether he changeth his purposes or occasions as we do? Denied, bec. he is unchangable and cannot see better Reasons.
    2. ¶ When an action is said to be transient, ’tis not as if the action it self went over to another subject, for accidents never pass from subject to subject nor if the effect be an Accident, as the heating of water by a fire: dos that pass over for the same Reason? For if heat did pass from the fire it would loose heat by heating, but it is thus; the heat of the fire continually begetts a heat in the water, which therefore serves to pass but dos not; for the heat in the water is not of the same numericall heat, with that in the fire but is another begotten by it; so the teachers Learning doth not pass into the learner but exciteth a new Learning like it self, & so in the motion of bodies.

    Qualities power, action formality

    Immanent in Transient without doth lie

    Canons 9.

    1. 1. Actions are contrary as heating and cooking.
    2. 2. Actions are intended and Remitted as this fire hath more than that both by Quantity, heat, cold.
    3. 3. Actions always inferr passion, if there be heating Something is heated.
    4. 2. Passion is an Accident, whereby the subject is said formally to suffer, or be any thing, or rather whereby it Receiveth the term produced by the agent, so the agent, so that which is said to be heated receiveth the heat produced by the fire.

    Intentional, to action term doth give

    Sensible change is by Transmutative.

    1. Canons are 3 like unto action.
    2. 1. Passions are contrary 2. have degrees. 3. Inferreth action.

    Syn. cap. 9.

    1. 1. Whereness is an Accident answering the question Where? and denominates the subject to be some where, as in the house, field, London &c. or tis the transcendentall Relation between the subject & place.

      ¶ tis said to be an Accident by the aintients, but the neoterics or latter Phylosophers will account this (and the 3 that follow) but modes of being, & not compleat beings, and therefore not Accidents.

      Distinctions of whereness are 3. Repletive, definitive, circumscriptive.

      1. 1. Repletive of that which fills all places, so God only who is neither Included in, nor excluded of any place, is called omniprescence.
      2. 2. Definitive, is prescence in a place after the manner of a spirit, that is, when the whole thing is so in the whole space that it may be in any part of the space. So an Angell may be in the whole room, and so again next moment may be in any part or point of the room: but a spirit thô it dos extend it self to a certain space, yet dos not posess that space so as to expell any other body or spirit but may be together with it. tis called penetrability, as it is before noted, cap. 6. of quantity.
      3. 3. Circumscriptive, is the prescence of anything in a certain space after the manner of a body, this is here intended and is Impenetrability, see cap. 6.

        Species of whereness circumscriptive are as various as places, all which are comprehended in the 2 globes, and are discoursed of in

    Canons of Whereness circumscriptive are.

    1. 1. Every body hath its where, places being concreated with bodies.
    2. 2. no two bodies can have the same (be they never so minute) bec: bodies are Impenetrable, (as is said before).

      ¶ hence we say (against the Lutherians consubstantiation) the reall body of christ, and reall body of bread cant consist in the same space. therefore the Papist make it transubstantiation. changing the body of bread into the body of christ yet keeping the Accident of bread; but this is contrary to the other Logicall Rule [Accidents can’t change subject.] the truth is, Jesus Christ hath a Reall prescence in his Sacraments [not only fancied] but it is a Reall Spiritual not a Reall corporall: a Presence to faith and not to sence.

    Replete, Defin’d, and Circumscription

    Each body hath its where, no 2 have one

    1. 2. Whenness is an Accident answering to the question When; or it is the transcendentall Relation between a thing and time, it denominates the subject to be at some time, yesterday, tomorrow, now, 7 years hence or since &c. this is in some duration, which is 3 fold.
      1. 1. Eternity, the duration of a thing without beginning or end; ’tis only proper to God.
      2. 2. Everlastingness, which hath beginning but no end, as Angells and mens souls.
      3. 3. Time, which has beginning and end, as all naturall bodies and forms of beasts.

        species of whenness are according to the parts of time—

    1. ¶ the nature of time consists in succession or flux, like a river made up of continual passing water between whose parts Instant or now is [as was said] a common term, as point in Quality to line, this mode the Aintients count time a species of Quantity

    Eternity, everlastingness sublime—

    of God and Spirits are, of bodies time

    Canons of Whenness.

    1. 1. Time has before and after [but not Eternity which is said to be a continuall now expressed in Hyeroglyphicks by a circle whose line has no form but ends in it self.
    2. 2. Time is created with body and therefore said by some to be but a mode of body, and no distinct being or Accident

      ¶ A mode is an Inseparable Appurtenance to a thing.

    3. 3. there is a time for every thing which is fit and seasonable, ’tis called opportunity the best of time.

    1. 3. Situation, is an Acci: whereby the subject is said to have an order of parts in space.

      ¶ Site Respects the parts, as where, the whole, A thing may change site, when it doth not place, it answers to the Question [in what posture] as standing, lying, sitting, Leaning &c.

    1. Inside, outside, may be referred to the other

    Above, below, are common unto all

    before, behind, Right, left, to Animal

    1. 4. Habit is an Acci: whereby the subject is said to be formally habited, ’tis materially habited by habit, therefore ’tis not the gown but the having on the gown (or gownation as you may call it] that is the Accident and this we say is inherent, thô that gown but adherent or adjacent, this Answers the Question [how clad]

    Syn. cap. 10.

    Cap. 11. Of Postpredicaments

    Postpredicaments, a Doctrine explaining the Predicaments as Appendix or Postscript to them. opposition, priority, motion, & modes of having

    1. 1. Opposition, is a diversity of 2 simple terms, which cannot agree either between themselves, or in a 3d, at the same time, & in some respect of part.

      ¶ 1. of 2 terms [as virtue, vice] but if one be opposed equally to two, [as liberality to prodigality and covetousness] they are called disparate not opposite.

    2. 2. Simple terms, [as white, black] to distinguish from the opposition of Propositions which are complex terms, and belong to the second part of Logick as he is white, he is black.
    3. 3. not between themselves; for white cant be black.
    4. 4. nor is a 3d term, namely a 3d Individual, as John is white, therefore it cant be said of John, he is black, but in a 3d generation or species they may agree, as white is a quality or colour so it is black too.
    5. 5. at the same time; so water cant be at the same time hot and cold, though it may successively.
    6. 6. in the same Respect as a sword may be rendered to a madman as his proper goods, but not as a madman; so that it is first to render the man his sword and it is not fit; may be both true but not in the same Respect.
    7. 7. In the same part: so an Ethiopian is black and white, namely in the skin and tooth.

    1. 1. Relative, between relative terms, as if he be a father to John he cant be Johns son.
    2. 2. contrary, between contrary terms, contraries are such as most differunder the same species;—as black and white whereas black and yellow are said to be diverse, but not opposites. So hard and soft, smooth and rough, hot and cold, are contraries.

      ¶ these do mutually expell each other out of the same subject and are only qualities

    3. 3. Privative, is between privative terms; that is any Positive Acci: & is absence, from a capable subject as sight and blindness.

      ¶ if the subject be uncapable the absence is not privation, but bare negation, as we say not [a stone is blind] but [a stone does not see or is not seeing] but a horse may be properly said to be blind, the absence of sight in a horse is blindness [a privation] in a stone is not seeing [negative]

    4. 4. contradictory, between contradictory terms; that is express affirmative and negative, a man and not a man &c.

    1. ¶ contradiction is the greatest opposition, admitting no mean either of participation or of abnegation. A mean of Participation is a third thing of which both may be affirmed in one Respect or other. A mean of abnegation is a third thing of which both may be denied in one respect or other.18 Relatives and contraries may have a mean of participation; so the same man may be a father and a son in Respect of divers persons; and the same water may be hot and cold in divers times, or at the same time in remiss degrees. Privatives may admitt a mean of abnegation; as a stone is neither seeing nor blind, but not seeing nor void of sight. but contradictories admitt neither, not participation; for nothing is both man and not man. nor abnegation; for their is nothing that is not either man or not man.

    1. 2. Priorty. posteriority and simulty are modes whereby one thing with respect to another are said to be before, after, and together with, there are 6 of these; I shall speak of priority, which will show the rest. priority is either in
      1. 1. Time, when one is ended before another begins, as Abraham: &c Moses, that either—not ended— — —as Abraham and Isaac.
      2. 2. nature, that from which another is derived, and is not converted as to a necessity of existence so Genus is before species; Animal before man, which are not converted, for thô it be necessaryly true [if there be a man there is an Animal] yet on the other hand it follows not convertible [if there be an Animal there must be a man] for it may be a beast, yea beasts were made when yet man was not.
      3. 3. Knowledge, that which is first known or knowable, and that is either
        1. 1. in respect of the nature of things, and in themselves. So a species is more knowable than an Individuall; because species cant bedefin’d by an essentiall Definition [as man is a Rational Animal] Whereas Individualls can only be Described by a number of Accidents. as [Socrates is a Learned man, born at athens &c.]
        2. 2. In Repect of us, that is more easily perceived by us. So Individualls are more knowable then species; bec: they are perceived by the senses, species only by reason & speculation.
      4. 4. Order, that which is accounted, placed, named, or numbred first, as the preface to a book.
      5. 5. Cause, that which is the cause of another.

    1. 6. Dignity or worth, as the prince is before the subject; thou art worth 10000 of us. 2 Samuell 18.319
    2. 3. Motion. Its terms and species

    1. 2. Species 6.

    1. 4. Modes of having [because of the equivocall sense of the word habit derived from having] are usually accounted. 8. but I think 3 will serve, for habit is put20 either.
      1. 1. in generall, for every positive Acci: So habit is opposed to privation, whence that

    1. 2. particulary

    Syn. Cap. 11.

    1. 1. Definition is the explication of a name or thing.
      1. 1. of a name (nominal) explains the signif: a word that either by
        1. 1 more common words, as sacrament [a sacred seal of the covenant] trinity [.3. in. 1.]
        2. 2. Etymologie [that is the Reason of the name] as prophesie [a speaking before] Apostle [one that is sent] evangelist [A bringer of glad tidings]
      2. 2. of a thing [real] explains the nature and being of a thing & is either.
        1. 1. essential, by essential and intrinsick terms [Genus &. Diff:]. so man is a Rational Animal.
        2. 2. Accidentall cald description by genus

    Requisites to Definition are.

    1. 1. that it be plain; for its end is to explain, [not by more obscure terms] as a forester is the Diaphanous part of an ædiface to Intromit luminous particles into an opaque concavity &c.
    2. 2. as short as may be; tis best when only the Genus & Diff: are expressed in 2 words as Rational Animal.
    3. 3. Equall to the thing Defined.

    1. 2. Division, is the Resolution of the whole into its parts, is either
      1. 1. Nominal, when an ambiguous [or equivocal word] is Resolved into its several significations as a dog is either

    1. 2. Real, when a thing is so Resolved, ’tis either
      1. 1. perfect, when the whole is divided into parts intrinsicall, the whole is
        1. 1. universall into its part that are under it [substitutive]

    1. 2. Essentiall into its essentiall parts [constitutive] as those are either
      1. 1. Methaph. [Genus & Diff:] so man is divided

    1. 2. Physical [matter & form] so man is divided

    1. 3. Integral, into integrant parts so a human body

    1. 2. Imperfect, when the Division is made by terms extrinsick: & so is divided.
      1. 1. Subject by Accident as water is

    1. 2. An Accident by its Subject so there is one heat

    1. 3. An Acci: by Accidents so colour is

    Requisites to Division are.

    1. 1. that the members be lowest [i.e.] only 2 if it may be with conveniency. Division by 2 is called Dichotomie, and is best for acuracy.21
    2. 2. opposite, as moral action is

    1. 3. Adequate, that is equal, as man is

    Syn. cap. 12.