The First part of Logick.

    Wherein is considered the nature of perception, as also the nature of the objects of perception. We heard in the preface (pp. 257)3 operations of the mind, ought to be divided into 4 parts, and that the first part doth respect Idea’s, or the simple perception of things; our business therefore now is to take into consideration this act of perception, and likewise the objects of this Art.

    Cap. 1. of perception, and it’s modes.

    Perception in generall the minds being conscious of, or making present unto it self, an Idea.

    The modes of species of perception are 3. pure intellection; imagination; & sense; for each of these ways does the mind of man perceive or think of things.

    The mind is said partly to understand, when it perceives a thing whereof there was no Image or footstep in the brain:—thus the mind Apprehends or perceives Spiritual things, universalls, common notions, An Idea of Perfection and all it’s own Thoughts:

    The mind is said to Imagine when it Apllyes it self not to the thing itself being present to the externall sense, but to a Phantasm or footstep of the thing being Imprinted on the brain. Thus it perceives a figure, the stars. A machine &c:—These perceptions are Termed Imaginations, because the mind by Representing those things to it self does feign Images in the brain:—Hence since the mind cannot form Images of Spirituall things it follows that properly it cannot be said to Imagine them.

    The mind is said to be sensible of, or, to perceive by sence, when the objects are present to the external sense and do affect the outward organs. Thus the mind apprehends a stone, a house, a cat, a man &c

    These perceptions are called Sensations, because they require the present aid of the Senses.

    That the mind perceives only those 3 ways, is thus demonstrated.

    Whatever is objected to the mind is either Spiritual, or material; If it is Spiritual, It can be Apprehended only by the bare understanding: If it is materiall, it necessarily is either present or absent; If it is absent, the mind ordinarily represents it to it Self only by the Imagination: If it is present, the mind perceives it by Impressions made on the organs of the senses.—hence it is manifest, that the object of the understanding is of a more large extent than the object of Imagination.

    Note here, that there is no error in the understanding or Imagination whils’t they do continue in the pure contemplation of things; the reason is, because if the Idea, which the mind had; does differ from the thing that is to be perceived, then it cannot be said to be a false representation of that thing; for it is no representation of it at all.

    Cap. 2. of the objects of perception

    Whatever is perceived by the mind is exhibited either as a thing or as an affection of a thing, or as a thing with it’s affections:

    A thing is that which subsists of it self; or, that which needs not any other Substance that so it may exist. As a Stone, a Tree, this or that man, Angells, &c, by which Definition, all affections or modes are excluded, because altho in some respect they may be said to exist, Viz: as they are found in things whereof they are modes, yet they do so depend on these things that they cannot exist separated from them, as figure, motion, and the like and therefore they cannot properly be termed Things. By a thing here we understand that which others call substance.

    Note, that altho we Define Substance a Being subsisting of it Self, yet we cannot distinctly understand any substance unless by some Attributes which do agree to it, nay, the truth is, by how much the more Attributes are known in a Substance or Thing, so much the clearer will the knowledge of that thing be; for Attributes or properties are as it were certain forms which do actuate Things and Separate one from another: Thus we more readily know what the Rational Soul is, by conceiving it as a Thinking Substance, Then by conceiving it as existing; for in that I know that it does think I may conclude necessarily, that it does exist, since it is Impossible that any thing should Think and yet not exist.

    An affection of a thing is that which gives a certain denomination to a substance, and can by no means subsist without it. Thus, when I consider of Roundness, I have an Idea which denominates a thing round, which I cannot conceive of as existing unless at the same time I conceive of a body in which this roundness is.

    A thing with it’s affections or a thing modyfied is a being determined by some certain mode or affection. Thus, when I Joyn a mode with a body and consider of a round body, the Idea, which I then have {exhibits to me} a thing modified.

    Hither may be Reduced the ten Predicaments of Aristotle, In that they were classes or heads to which that Philosopher did reduce all the objects of perception, for after he had divided Ens4 into Substance & Accident, he sought out these 10 categories under which all Substances and Accidents Imaginable were said to be contained, all Substances being reduced to the first, all accidents to the other 9 categories or predicaments. We shall mention them particulary.

    1. 1. Substance, which is either Spiritual or corporal.
    2. 2. Quantity, which is either discrete when it has divided parts, as in number; or continual, when its parts are conjoyn’d; which is either successive as in Time and motion, or permanent which is called a space or extension into length wedth & profundity: Bare Longitude makes line; longitude with latitude make a superficious; all three constitute a Solid.
    3. 3. Quality, whereof Aristotle makes 4 species, The first whereof comprehends all the habits of the mind and dispositions of the body which are obtained by reiterated acts, As Sciences, Virtues, Vices, The art of writing, painting, Dancing, &c: The second denotes the natural powers; such are the faculties of the mind and body, as the understanding, the will, the memory, the five senses, the faculty of walking &c. the Third denotes the Sensible Qualities, such as hardness, softness, Gravity, heat, cold, colours, sounds, odours, savours, &c. the fourth species denotes that form and figure which is the extrinsick determination of Quantity; as to be Round, Quadrated, Spherical, cubical &c.
    4. 4. Relation, or a Respect of one thing to another; as of A father to a son, A master to a servant, a power to the object and to which we may annex all things which are notes of comparisons, as to be like, equal, greater, less, &c.
    5. 5. Action, either considered in it self; as to walk, leap, know, love &c; or without, as, to smite, to cut, to break &c.
    6. 6. Passion, as to be smitten, broken, manifested &c.
    7. 7. Whereness, when we answer a question concerning place; As, {he} is at Rome, in his chamber, or the like.
    8. 8. Whenness, when we make answers to a question concerning time, As when he lived? An hundred years since: when was this acted? Yesterday, &c.
    9. 9. Scituation, As, to sitt, to stand, to lye down &c.
    10. 10. Habit, As, to have something about one self for cloathing, ornament, defence and the like.

    Thus we have a view of Aristotle’s ten categories, which (according to some) are so many mysteries to be admired at and adored; but to speak plainly they are altogether unprofitable and so far from being helpfull in passing a right Judgment (which is the only scope of Logick) that they very often are prejudiciall and do great harm in this respect, & that especially on 2 accounts.

    1. 1. In that they do suppose that ens is truly divided into Substance and Accident: for this is a notion altogether destitute and void of Reason, since it is most certain that Accidents (As taken by the Aristotelians) can by no means properly be said to be beings or things; for could they be so termed we might undoubtedly conceive of them as capable of existing in themselves; the Consequence of which argument appears from the Definition which we gave of res in this Chapter.
    2. 2. This predicamental doctrine is faulty in that it constitutes 9 classes or heads of Accidents & numbers them thus, Quantity, Quality, Action, Passion, &c, as, before: for hereby 1. those things are made distinct heads which really do not differ: as Quantity, figure and quality, when as physical qualities are nothing but the result of quantity, figure & motion; So likewise, action & passion are species or modes of motion & consequently Improperly made distinct heads or predicaments. 2. Relation is constituted the third head, whenas it by no means belongs to the Genealogy of things, because it is not any thing absolute, but a bare affection of reason Viz. an opposition which some respect, so that altho we do approve and allow of Aristotle’s design in finding out severall heads, to which he might reduce every thing that we may can perceive, yet we cannot but highly condemn & reject the method which was taken to accomplish this his design.

    In the room of these 10 categories, some do propose seven heads which they express in this latin distich viz.

    Mens, Mensura, quies, motus, positura, figura Sunt cum materia, cunctarum exordia rerum.5

    And they are persuaded that the whole of nature is contained under these 7 classes: by mens they understand a thinking substance, by materia, an extended substance:—by mensura, magnitude:—by positura, the site or disposition of parts among themselves:—by figura, motus, et quies, that which is usually understood thereby.

    Sr Kenelm Digby6 is of the mind that Aristotle is highly abused, here by his followers; and that that Great philosopher never intended or Imagined (as his followers do assert of him) that these 9 predicaments which are termed Accidents, were positive entities really distinct from the thing or substance wherein they are, or to which they do belong. In his Conclusion annexed to his treatise of bodies7 he thus expresses himself concerning the case that is before us.

    “I think not amisse to touch the late sectatours, or rather pretenders of Aristotle (for truly they have not his way) have Introduced a modell of Doctrine (or rather of Ignorance) out of his words, which he never so much as dreamed of; howbeit they alledge texts out of him to confirm what they say, as hereticks do out of Scripture to confirm their assertions; for whereas he called certain collections or positions of things by certain common names (as the art of Logick required) terming some of them Qualities, others Actions others Places, or Habits or Relatives, or the like; these his later followers have conceived that these names did not design A concurrence of sundry things, or a diverse disposition of the parts of any thing, out of which some effect resulted, which the understanding considering Altogether, hath expressed the notion of it by one name; but have Imagined that every one of these names had correspondent unto it some real positive entity or thing separated (in it’s own nature) from the main thing or Substance in which it was, &c indifferent to any other Substance, but {in all} unto which it is linked, working still the effect which is to be expected from the nature of such a quality {or} Action {&c}. And thus to the very negatives of things as to the names of points, lines, Instants, and the like; they have Imagined positive entities to correspond: likewise, to the names of actions, places & the like, they have framed other entities; as also to the names of colours, sounds, tasts, smells, Touches and the rest of the sensible qualities, they have unto every one of them allotted Special entities, and generally to all qualities whatsoever; whereas nothing is more evident than that Aristotle meaned by qualities no other thing, but that disposition of parts, which is proper to one body & is not found in all:”

    Afterwards the forementioned Author adds.

    “Let these so peremptory pretenders of Aristotle shew me but one text in him, where he admitteth any middle distinction (such as those modern Philosophers do, and must needs admitt who maintain the qualities we have rejected) betwixt that which he calleth numericall, and that which he calleth of reason or of notion, or of definition (the first of which we may term to be of or in things, the other to be in our heads or discourses; or the one natural, the other Logical) and I will yeild that they have reason & that I have grosly mistaken what he hath written and that I do not reach the depth of his sense: but this they never will be able to do.”

    Thus the Author in the conclusion—p. 426. 427. 428. & in the treatise it self Chapt: 1: p. 6. Sr Kenelm, having said that there are 2 sorts of words to express our notions, the one common to all men, the other proper to scholars, does deliver these words:

    “Of the first kind are those 10 Generall heads which Aristotle calleth predicaments; under which he (who was the most Judicious orderer of notions and director of mens conceptions, that ever lived) hath comprized whatsoever hath or can have a being in nature: for when any object occurreth to our thoughts, we either consider the essentiall & fundamentall being of it, or we refer it to some species of quantity; or we discover some qualitites in it; or we perceive that it doeth or that it suffereth something, or we conceive it in some determinate place or time & the like; of all which every man living that enjoyeth but the use of reason finds naturally within himself at the very first naming of them, a plain, compleat, & satisfying notion which is the same without any of the least variation, in all mankind, unless it be in such who have Industriously and by force, and with much labour, perplexed and depraved, those primary and sincere Impressions which nature had freely made in them.”

    From all which it’s evidently Sr Kenelm’s opinion that the Doctrine of the predicaments as it is now taught by the Aristotellians and rejected by the late philosophers, never was taught or thought of by Aristotle whom it is fathered on.8

    Cap. 3. of Substance & its Divisions

    We heard in the foregoing Chapt: that substance is that which stands not in need of any other substance in order to it’s existing: we may here further observe how it is divided.

    Substance is 2 fold; created & Increated.—created is that, which althô it stands in need of the divine concorse and cannot possibly exist without it, yet may be perceived as existing without the help of any other thing. Increated is that, which is simply & Absolutely independent on every other being; As the Eternal God.—

    Created things, or substances are either intellectual or material.

    An intellectual substance is a thinking substance; or a thing where in Immediately there is cogitation; As the mind, to which belong all cogitative arts or modes as to understand, Imagine & to perceive by sense [sentize].

    A materiall substance or a body is a substance extended into length, weadth & profundity. Or, it is the Immediate subject of local extension & all those modes which do presuppose extension; As magnitude, motion, figure, site and all other things which cannot be perceived without local extension as their foundation.

    From the premises it appears that there are but 2 kinds of things or Substances to be admitted, viz. material & intellectual; all other objects of perception are referred to those things as modes or affections, of which we shall discourse in the following chapters.

    Cap. 4. of the affections of things & their divisions.

    We heard in the second chapter that an affection of a thing is that which gives a certain denomination to a substance or thing, and can by no means subsist with out it.

    These affections may be distinguished into Attributes, modes, & qualities.

    Attributes are such affections as give denomination to a thing but do no way alter it or distinquish it from other things: As one-nesse, verity, bonify, Perfection, and the like.

    Onenesse is that whereby any thing is said to be undivided in it self. It is 2 fold, per se & per accidents. Those things are said to be one [per se] by themselves, which have an undivided nature; whether they are simple or compound; for the multitude of parts hinders not unity, or one-nesse, if so be that the connection of the parts be entire; thus man is said to be one althô he consists of parts of a differing nature and separable one from the other, those things are said to be one by Accident [per Accidens] which are so compounded of disjoyn’d parts as that there is no perfect union between them; Thus an army, is termed one body, because it consists of men, among whom there is not but an Imperfect union.

    Verity is that, whereby a name is said to agree with a thing signifyed by that name: so that to find the truth of a thing is nothing else but to find out the real nature of a thing: otherwise it is described, That whereby a thing is agreeable to it’s Idea:

    Bonity is that, whereby a thing is fit for use, or serves to the end for which it was made:

    ¶ That if a thing has such an essence as it ought to have, i.e. if it is true, it will necessarily likewise be good; hence we oftentimes confound the denominations of good & true: Thus we call a True Syllogism a good one & the like:

    ¶ further, that althô the 3 forementioned attributes are by most accounted the most generall or common affections of things, yet some account the notion as absurd:—As for unity, these say that it is no manner of way distinquished from the thing it self, or that it adds nothing to a being, but is only a mode of thinking whereby we do separate one thing from others which are like to it, and do agree with it in some respects.—as for verum and falsum, these Authors assert that they are only extrinsick denominations of things and are attributed to them only Rhetorically:—As for bonum and malum, according to these authors they are relative or respective terms; A being being termed good or evill as it conduces to the advantage or disadvantage of some other thing.

    Modes are such affections of things as do not only denominate a thing but also do in some measure distinquish it from other things.

    They are either universal or Speciall

    Universal modes are such as do agree to many things: they are termed Genus, Difference, Species, proprium et accidens of which we shall discourse in a distinct chapter.

    Special are such modes as do agree only to particular things. Thus, Intellection & understanding &c are modes of a thinking thing:—Quality, or magnitude, figure, site, motion &c are modes of extended things:—Appetite; as hunger & thirst:

    and touching and their affections, as Watching and sleeping and the affections or passions, as Love, hatred, Joy, Greif, hope, fear & their species all which result from the conjunction of a thinking and extended substance, are all modes of such a substance, also to be a totum or apart; a cause or an effect, a subject or adjunct, like or dislike, equal or unequal, and the like (for which we shall reserve the 6th chapter) may all be termed modes of things, in as much as they denominate things and in a measure distinquish between them.

    Qualities we reckon such attributes or affections, as do not only denominate things, and in a measure distinguish them, but also denote the such-ness of things: or in other words, a Quality is that whereby Restails denominatur.9 qualities as heat, and cold, moisture and dryness, rarity and density, fluidity and hardness and the rest of which Physicks treat. likewise among this number we may reckon Justice and Injustice, fortitude and cowardize and the other moral virtues and vices of which ethicks or moral Phylosophy does discourse. This mode answers the question (i.e. accidentally) what kind or sort of as, what kind or what sort of man was Solomon: Wise &c.

    Cap. 5. of the 5 Universalls, [Genus, Species &c]

    Among the universalls genus obtains the first place and that for its dignity. It being as it were the head on which the others as so many members do depend, & without which they perish &c come to nothing.

    Genus is an universal which is predicated of more things specifically distinct, answering to the question what is? Thus substance is a Genus in respect of an extended substance, which is called a body, and of a thinking substance which is termed a mind, or Spirit, for if we ask, what is a body? What is a spirit? the answer is, A Substance, A Substance, that to be specifically distinguished is to differ essentially, so that there is an essentiall part in the one that is not in the other.10 distinquished, bec: in man there is a mind or Rational soul which is not in a beast.

    Genus is twofold; most generall is the highest; & Subalternate. The most generall genus is that which has no genus above it, whether it be ens or substantia it matters not, neither does this question belong to Logick but Metaphisick.

    A subalternate Genus is that which is placed between the highest genus & lowest species: or, that which in respect of what is above, is a species, & in respect of what is below is called a Genus. Thus, a beast, if considered with respect to Animal, is a species, but if with respect to a dog, a bear, a lyon &c then it is a Genus. Henc Animal is the remote genus of a dog, bear &c and the next genus of a beast.

    Species is an univerall which is predicated of more things distinct only in number, also in the question, What is? thus to the question, What is peter? What is John? &c we answer, he is a man.

    Species is twofold; most special or lowest, & middle or subalternate: the latter althô in respect of a Genus under which it is, is named a species; Thus (lest the multitude of examples should confound us) a beast which is a species of Animal, is termed a Genus when it respects a dog and a bear.

    The most special species (which especially we here intend) is that which Immediately is predicated of Individualls: as man of Peter & John: a Circle of every particular Circle:—It is termed most special or lowest because it has no species below it, but only Individualls.

    Difference may be considered divers ways:

    1. 1. as it is constitutive of a species; and then it may be defined, that by which a species exceeds a genus: as man adds Animal to rational.
    2. 2. as it is something predicable; & thus it usually is defined, an universall which is predicated of many things in their species distinct essentially, answering to the question What sort or manner?—as what kind of animal is man? A. Rationall:—This Definition does agree only to an Intermediate difference.
    3. 3. as it divides Genus into divers species:—Thus Animal is divided into Rational & Irrational, & constitues 2 species, viz. man & beast.
    4. 4. As it is an essential part of an whole compositum, and then it enters into it’s essence & belongs to it’s definition; whereby it is distinquished from proprium & Accidens which do not enter the essence.
    5. 5. that in every species there is necessarily found something besides the Genus; otherwise there would be no distinction among species since they all do agree in their genus: hence there must be some difference whence this distinction may be taken. Therefore Difference as it constitutes the 3d predicable may be thus defined, viz. that which is predicated of a species and those things which are contained under it, answering essentially to the question, What kind of &c:

    Proprium, property is taken 4 ways.

    1. 1. It denotes that which agrees only to a species, but not to the whole of species; i.e. not to all the Individualls of that species, thus, to be a Physitian belongs only to the species of man, yet belongs not to every Individual man.
    2. 2. It denotes that, which agrees to an whole species, but not only to that species:—thus, to go on two feet belongs (naturally) to every Individual man, but not only to men, because birds likewise go on two feet. This is the meanest property.
    3. 3. It denotes that, which agrees only and wholly to a species but not at all times:—Thus, the hoary head agrees only to man & to all men, but not at all times, for childhood and youth are (naturally) destitute therof.
    4. 4. It denotes that, which agrees only, wholly and at all times to a species. Thus it is the property of every circle, only of a circle, and evermore of a circle, that all the lines which are drawn from the center to the circumference are equal:—This last kind of property constitues the 4th predicable or univeral, and then it may be defined, that which is predicated of many things, by it self and necessarily, yet not essentially necessarily, because a property does so belong to a thing as that it cannot so much as by our mind be separated therefrom; It so follows the essence of a thing as that it is converted therewith:—thus it is an essential property of a triangle that 2 of it’s sides be greater then the third; that it’s 3 angles be equall to two right angles &c.

    An accident is that which is not the substance, neither dos necessarily belong to it, but only contingently annexed to it:—otherwise; It is that which may be present or absent without the destruction of the Subject.

    It is 2 fold Separable and Inseparable.

    Separable is that which can easily be removed from the subject wherein it is conceived to be: as to sleep from man. Inseparable is that which by the strength of nature cannot be taken from the subject wherein it is:—As whiteness from a swan; blackness from an Æthiopian &c.: althô by our thoughts this whiteness & blackness may be removed, since we can think of a swan without whiteness, and of a man without blackness:

    ¶ Note: (as before) that hereby an Accident is distinquished from a property which cannot thus be separated from it’s subject.

    That this division of universal is adequate, containing no more, nor yet fewer members then it ought, is thus demonstrated.

    The Idea which we form in our minds and use to represent many things, either exhibits many things specifically distinct, and so a genus is framed; or many things numerically distinct, & so a species is constituted; or represents the differences wherby many singulars differ among themselves and from other things and so difference is made; or a property which belongs only to these things and hence proprium; or lastly a certain contingency seperable from the essence of things and hence accident, or the 4th universal is constituted.

    Many things are wont to be objected against the notion of an Universal; but the arguments no ways reach us, who explain them after another manner then the Peripateticks do, and assert that these universals are nothing else but diverse modes of thinking, whereby the same thing is this way and the other way conceived in our minds and considered of by us: Le. Gr. P.27.—11

    Cap. 6th of a Totum and parts; Cause & effect &c.

    We heard (cap. 4.) that to be a Totum or a part, a cause or an effect, like or dislike, equal or unequal &c, were accounted modes, and we then promised to explain the nature of these modes in pursuance of which promise we shall Improve this sixth chapter.

    Totum is that which hath parts and may be divided thereinto, for that which is destitute of parts is Improperly termed a totum; hence the Aristotelians err when they assert that mans soul is wholly in mans body and wholly in every part of it, since the soul being an Intellectual substance, is without parts & consequently exists in the body after an indivisible manner: for an Immaterial Substance cannot be termed an whole unless negatively.

    A totum is 3 fold, essential, Integral & universal.

    • An essential Totum is that which consists of parts whereof one is in the other; As matter and form; Thus man consists of a mind and a body.
    • An Integral totum or an Integrum is that which has parts without parts: Thus man consists of an head, of hands, feet &c.
    • An Universal totum is a genus related to it’s species: as animal to man & beast: man to Socrates and Plato &c.

    A part is that which helps to the constituting of a totum: It is either principal without which a totum cannot consist, as the head in a mans body; or less principal, which being taken away the totum indeed is not destroyed, yet is mutilated; as the hand in a mans body.

    A cause (as the schooles teach us thô obscurely) is that, by the force of which anything is produced; or that from which a thing is:

    Its division into material, formal, efficient & final is very famous & must be insisted on: Le-Gr: partis: i Cap: 9.12

    • A material cause is that out of which things are made or formed; As wax is the matter out of which torches are made:—Hence whatever agrees or disagrees to matter does likewise agree or disagree to the things which are constituted out of that matter.
    • A formal cause (or form) is that which constitutes a thing, and does discriminate it from other things. Thus, the rational soul is the form of man. Thô, whether the forms of other things are Physical entities (as they speak in the schooles) distinct from the matter it self, and not the bare modification of matter or disposition of parts is a Quare to be resolved in Physick. These two causes are term’d Internal because they remain in those things whose essence they constitute.
    • An efficient cause is that which produces another thing: It is manifold for an efficient cause is
      1. 1. total and partial

        Total, or adequate when it produces an effect of it self, without the help of any other efficient. Thus God created Adam.

        Partial, when two or more efficients concurr in producing an effect.—Thus man &c woman in producing a child.

      2. 2. proper and accidental

        Proper,—Thus the Sun is the proper cause of Light.

        Accidental,—Thus the Sun is the Accidental cause of that mans destruction who is killed by too much heat; Bec: it is from an ill disposition of that mans body, that the Sun’s heat Injures it.

      3. 3. next and remote

        next,—Thus the father is the next cause of the son.

        Remote,—Thus the grandfather is the remote cause of the son.

      4. 4. producing and conserving

        Producing or effective,—thus the mother of a son, because she effects things which did not before exist.

        Conserving,—Thus the nurse because she preserves that which before did exist.

      5. 5. univocal and æquivocal

        univocal,—Thus the father with respect to his sons, because they are of the same nature with himself.

        Æquivocal,—Thus God with respect to the creatures, because their natures are different from his.

      6. 6. principal and instrumental

        Principal,—which acts from it’s own will,—as the Artist that builds the house.

        Instrumental,—which acts as it is directed by the principal cause,—as the hammer, saw, &c in the hands of the Artist.

      7. 7. universal and particular

        Universal,—as water coming out of a fountain and moving divers machines is the universall cause of that motion.

        Particular,—Thus the figure and disposition of the pipes which determines the universal cause & restrains it to some certain effect.

      8. 8. natural and voluntary

        Naturall,—which acts from the propension & necessity of nature without any precedaneous knowledge. As the fire, Sun &c.

        Voluntary; which acts Spontaneously and not from any force or necessity.

      9. 9. proper and improper

        proper,—Thus when the chamber is enlightened by the Sun, the Sun is the proper cause of that light.

        Improper,—(or causa sine quâ non) Thus the opening of the window is the causa sine quâ non of the chamber’s being enlightened.

      10. 10. physical and moral

        Physical, thus fire burning the house is the Physical cause of the burning, because fire of it’s own nature does properly burn.

        Moral, Thus, the serpent by persuading the first parents to eat of the forbidden fruit was the moral cause of their fall.

    The final cause, or end is that for which a thing is thus the end of a mans studying is that he may obtain knowledge. The end is 2 fold, Primary & Secondary.

    • Primary is that which is principally Intended, thus the end of a knife is to cutt.
    • Secondary or less principal is that which moves the efficient less, and is considered as a motive &c. Thus cloathes being an ornament to the body is a secondary reason why we wear them. An effect is that which exists out of the causes: from the fourfold division of cause effect must be accounted (says Le-Gr.p. 47) fourfold.13

    A subject is that to which any thing is adjoyned, or, to which anything happens besides it’s essence: Thus the body is the subject of cloathes &c. A subject is 2 fold Inhasrentiæ &c Adhærentiæ

    • of Inherence, wherein something is received. Thus, the sponge is the matter wherein water is contained.
    • of Adherence, which receives something to it: Thus the hand is the subject of the glove.
    • Subject somtimes is taken some for the Object, and then it denotes that which is proposed to another power, that it may act something in it, or about it. thus the object of hearing is sound; of sight, Colour &c.

    An adjunct is that which is a thing besides it’s essence: whether this Accident carry any proper reality with it; or is nothing else but a mode of substance, as in the mind, love knowledge, in the body, motion figure &c.

    ¶ Note that an accidental adjunct is predicated of its subjects in concrete not in abstracts: Snow is white, not whiteness &c.

    Comparison is not the simple consideration of one thing, (says LeGrand) but the collation of one thing to another, to which we assent or dissent; and therefore he treats of it in the 2d part of Logick under Proposition or Judgment.

    Comparison is either in quantity or quality, comparison in quantity constitutes paria or Imparia.

    • Paria [equalls] are such things, which being compared do contain an equal proportion. Thus at the equinoxe, the night is equall with the day.
    • Imparia [unequalls] are such things as do contain an unequal proportion; or, do disagree in their quantity: Unequals are either greater or less.
      • Greater are unequalls which do exceed in quantity.
      • Lesse are unequalls which are exceeded in quantity. Comparison in quality constitutes similia or dissimilia.14
      • Like are such things as do agree in quality: or, which being compared, have some like affection: Thus the Sun and the fixed stars being compared among themselves, in respect of light which is found in each, are like.
      • Unlike are such things whose Qualities are diverse, or, such things as disagree in Qualities, actions, or passions. Thus a wise man is unlike to the moon &c.

    Cap. 7th of a thing with it’s affections

    A modifyed thing or a thing with it’s affections is (as we have heard) a being determined by some certain mode or affection: So that it is not the substance or being simply considered, nor yet the affection that becomes the object of perception here; but properly the being cloathed with some appendage or mode.

    These Appendages or additaments are somtimes made by pronoun relatives, and somtimes without them being expressed, for it is necessary that they be always understood and Implyed—thus, the body which is white; or the white body, which Intend the same thing.

    That which is principally to be observed in these complex terms is, that there are two kinds of these additaments, whereof one may be termed explicative, the other determinative.

    • Explicative is that which by apt words does explain that which before lay hid; Thus, when I say man who is an animal endued with reason; or, man who naturally desires happiness; and the like, these additaments are barely explicative, because that which is added does no ways change or alter the Idea which belongs to man in generall.
    • If these additaments are the essentiall Attributes of a thing then it is called a perfect explication or Definition; if they are only accidental, or not fully essential, it is then called an Imperfect explication or description.
    • Definition is either nominis or rei; the one explains the name, the other explains the thing: This difference is carefully to be heeded, and the parts to be distinquished, otherwise we shall run into many absurdities, which some of the Aintients by reason thereof were led into. See Legrands Appendix to his 10th Chap. Log: P. 52. book 1.40: also ARS cogitandi Part. 1. Cap. 7. 11. 1215

    of this first kind of additaments are all such as are applyed to names distinctly signifying Individuals, as when I say that Aristotle was the prince of Philosophers; that william the conqueror was king of England; for these singular terms being thus considered do loose nothing of their extension.

    • Determinative is that which restrains the signification of the generall term so that it cannot be taken in it’s due extension. Thus, when I say white bodies, wise men, Rational Animals and the like, these additaments are not simply explicative but determinative because they do mutilate and cutt short the extension of the first term; for (if we mind it) the name of body, of man and of Animal here does signify not every body, man & animal but only some of them.
    • The nature of these additaments is such sometimes, that they will constitute a singular out of a common term; viz: when they contain in them Individuating Circumstances; thus when I say the king of England now reigning, the common name of king is determined to the particular person of James the Second.

    There are also two other kinds of complex terms whereof one is complex in words, the other only in sense.

    of the first kind are only those terms which have an expressed addition: here the forementioned examples are proper.

    of the other kind are those terms {wherein} one is not expressed but only understood: Thus when english-men speak of the king; this term is in it’s self complex, because when we thus pronounce this name, the Idea of the common name [king] is not solitarily considered in our minds but has annexed to it the Idea of James the Second who now rules us, and is the king of England: there is an infinite number of terms which being after this manner complex do most frequently occur in discourse; Thus, in every family, A Master &c.

    Also how are some terms which are complex both in words & in sense, but after a different manner. Thus Princeps Philosophorum is complex in words, because the name of a prince is determined by the word Philosophers; but in respect of Aristotle whom the schoolmen do thus term it is only complex in sense, since the Idea of Aristotle is only in the mind and yet there is no speech that does expressly denote Aristotle in what is said.

    The end of the first book.