The Third Part of Logick

    of Syllogism, or Argumentation And Method

    Cap. 1 of Syllogism

    Argumentation is a speach in which from one or more Propositions another distinct Prop, is inferred by the note of Inference [therefore, Ergò]

    Syllogism is an Argumentation in which out of 2 Propositions Rightly disposed a 3d is inferred


    This is 2 fold categoricall and hypothetical.

    1. 1. categoricall, if all the Props be categoricall, as in the forementioned syllog.
    2. 2. hypotheticall, if one of the Props be hypo.

    In a Syllog. is considered the making & the use.

    1. 1. The making or fabrick, in which is considered the matter & form.
      1. 1. the matter out of which a Syllog. is made & that is either next or remote
        1. 1. the next matter out of which it is Immediately is 3 Propositions.

    1. 2. the Remote matter of a syllogism is that out of which The Propositions are made, and they

    1. Each of which terms is twice mentioned in the Syllogism, as, in the first above mentioned Syllogism, the mean is Rational the major Risible, the minor man.


    1. ¶ the mean must always be taken in the same Sense & Latitude in the minor, that it is in the major, for if the mean be equivocall or otherways taken in one of the promises then in the other ’tis called a double mean, & then the syllog. hath 4 forms which is fallacious.
    2. ¶ The minor term must always be the Subj: of the conclusion, & the middle term (or means) must never be in the conclusion. think of those 2 Rules and you will Readily & Rightly make & Judge of syllogisms.

    The mean is both the Premises is one

    Minor in Subject and Conclusion

    1. 2. the form of a syllogism is the Right disposition of the matter

    1. 1. figure (or Right disposing the terms) is 3 fold According to the placing of the middle term

    1. 2. Moods (or Right disposing of Propositions) are 14 usefull whereof

    1. ¶ There might be a 4th figure (prae: sub) and so there would be 4 more moods, but the force of their inference would be as the 1st figure & therefore as needless they may be Rejected.
    2. All the usefull moods are comprehended in these 3 cabbalistical verses.
    3. 1. bar-ba-ra cæ-la-rent da-ri-i for-ri-o [are Reduced]
    4. 2. cæs-a-re cam-es-tres fes-ti-no ba-ro-co
    5. 3. Da-rap-ti fe-lap-ton dis-am-is da-ti-si bo-car-do fe-ri-son27

      ¶ that in the writing of these you must put the [s. and .m] to this and of the foregoing Syllables, and not to the beginning of the following.

      ¶ for their understanding, that in each Syllable is one of the 4 vowels [a, e, i, o] which are the signs of quantity & quality [as in part 2d. ch. 3.] so bar-ba-ra is 3 universalls affirmative; cæ-la-rent is univers: neg: univers: aff: univers: neg:. &c. as in this Syllog: of the 4th mood of the 1st figure

    1. ¶ the vowels in this Parenthesis (are Reduced) refer to what follows them & signifie that the moods of the 2d and 3d figure (called Imperfect moods) are Reduced to the 4 moods of the 1st figure (called perfect moods) bec: the consequence of moods in the first figure is not only certain (as it is in the rest) but more evident than it is in the rest.
    2. Reduction is done by some consonants in the aforesaid cabalistical words these observable consonant are either

    1. Imperfect mood must be reduced to the perfect mood which begin with the same letter; so Baroco to Bar-ba-ra/cæs-a-re to cælarent &c. the subsequent (in the middle or latter part) of the words of art do signifie

    1. ¶ Reduction by conversion and transposition (done by s. m. p) is called ostensive.
    2. ¶ when you have a syllog: to Reduce, first observe if you have an m. or a c. in its charactoristical word; if you have an m. then begin with the Transposition.

    1. If you have a c: Reduce it to Impossible: this c. is found only in 2 moods (viz.) Boroco & bocardo: these must be Reduced to Barbara bec: of the b. Initiall, now in each of them you {see} an (a) that prop: being already fit for barbara must stand as it does, the other 2 props: must be thus altered, if the major be kept (as in baroco) the contradictory of the minor; must
    2. make the conclusion (& Reciprocally) the contradictory of the conclusion must make the minor, (that is the Partic: negatives must be made univers: affirmative) if the min: be kept as (in Bocardo) then so must you do with the maj:

    1. Now the Reduced Syllog: in Barbara has in it manifest falshood, therefore the Syllog: in Bocardo (contrary to the other) was before certainly and is now manifestly or evidently known true; for the contradictory to it appears to be Impossible & contradictories cannot be both either true or false.

    1. ¶ the weaker part is negative and partic: therefore in Ferio the Concl. partakes of the weakness of both the premises, is neg: from (fe) & partic: from (i).
    2. ¶ Syllogism is the primary species of Argumentation, the rest are but secondary and may be Reduced to it and must be tried by it, therefore I put this in a chapt. by it self and leave the rest to the next.

    Syn. Cap. 1.

    1. 1. Enthymem. [the 2d species of Argumentation is an Incomplete Syllog: having but 2 propositions expressed; the 3d is in the mind.

    1. for a sequel must always be proved by a sequel and this Reduces the dispute again to be categoricall, which is best, thô the other be somtimes most easy and Ready to the mind.

    1. ¶ if the conseq: of an hypoth: be not good (or to be denyed) the Respondent, says not [I deny the major] but (I deny the conseq:) but if the conseq. of an enthymem be to be denied, he must not say [I deny the sequel or conseq.] but [I deny the argument]

    1. the Respondent answers [I deny the sequel] the opponent proceeds to prove his sequel by an enthymem thus:

    1. The respondent answers [I deny the Argument] & not sequel as before.
    2. ¶ All this is no more than one plain categoricall & therefore it is best, for it might be better thus expressed

    1. here the respondent denyes the major without more to do.
    2. ¶ In disputes, the prop: denyed by the Respondent, must always be the conclusion of the opponents next syllogism.

    1. 2. Induction, is an argumentation from particulars sufficiently enumerated to Infer an universall conclusion; As, John is Rational; Peter is rational; William is rational; & of the rest, Ergò Every man is Rational, this is a good Induction: whereas if one should say, John is Learned, Tom is Learned, William is Learned; & so of the rest, then the Respondent answers [I deny the Induction] for person is not Learned, this is of use in natural Philosop: to settle general Propositions.

    1. 3. Example is an argumentation wherein one (or more) particular Instance is brought to prove another particular from the similitude or parity of reason

    1. The Ergò is from the similitude of glass to glass in brittleness: but there are other circumstances which may alter the case; as John let fall his glass on the stones but I let mine fall on the water, therefore the Respondent answers the case is not the same or there is no parity of Reason.
    2. ¶ Examples & similitudes are very seldom of much force bec: of the great diversity which may happen in the circumstances, yet they may force in oratory to illustrate: thô in logick they prove little.

    1. 4. Sorites is an argumentation by many propositions so heaped together as that the subject of one is the pred: of the other, till at last the first subject and last predicate are joyned together in the conclusion. As, Peter is a man; man is Animal; Animal is a sensitive, sensitive is a liver; liver is a body; body is a subject; Ergò Peter is a subject; tis of use for brevity or Recapitulation of a foregoing dispute to show how the whole series of Syllogisms make one solid Argument.

    1. 5. Dilemma, (or the 2 horn’d Argument) is that which smites the adversary on both sides that he cannot escape the one or the other Inconvenience:As, if you marry one that is fair, others will love her; if one that is foul, you’ll not love her your self; Ergò marry not at all. The weakness of it is if there be a safe mean between those 2 extreems; as if the fair be virtuous, no matter who loves her; and thô foul, if virtuous, I shall love her for her virtue; Ergò I may marry, provided she be virtuous.


    1. Besides the 5 mentioned there is a sort of arguing sometimes used in disputation called Violentum [Retortion or Inversion] when an argument brought to prove one thing is restarted & turned back upon the adversary to prove the contrary to which he brings it for. As, one said to Romulus when he drank but little wine; If all men should drink as you do wine would be cheap, no, says Romulus if all men should drink as I do wine would be dear for I drink as much as I will.
    2. This sort of arguing may be managed in any of the former kinds and therefore is not specifically distinct from them: it is an act of wit and quick fancy rather than solid Judgment, and therefore belongs rather to Rhetoric then Logic.

    Syn. Cap. 2.

    And first of Demonstration.

    Hitherto of the fabrick or making of Syllogisms now of the use or end which according to the matter is to

    1. 1. from its end, A syllog. to make to know, or to beget science, i.e. to understand the cause of a thing & cannot be otherwise; Things demonstrable are only properties; the principles (or middle term) to prove it to be in the subject is the Diff. So, Risibility (the property) is demonstrated to be in man (the subject) by Rationality, the Diff: as in this

    1. 1. That thing is,
      1. 1. in nature, answering the question [is there such a thing?]
      2. 2. in the subject, — — — [whether it be so?]
    2. 2. What it is as to
      1. 1. name [the signification of the word]
      2. 2. thing [the definition of the thing]

    1. The things that are foreknown by those precognitions are the

    1. 1. Subject of which something is to be demonstrated that it is in nature
    2. What if is both ways?
    3. 2. affection (or property) what as to name only.
    4. 3. the principle (or diff:) by which the affection is to be

    1. 2. From the matter, is a demonstration defin’d; A Syllog: made up of things true, necessary, Immediate, more knowable, Antecedant and the cause of the conclusion.
      1. 1. necessary when there is a perpetual & indisoluable connexion of

    1. necessity has 3 degrees; of all, Directly, & as it self.
    2. 1. of all, as properties of the 2d kind (all & always) so black of an Ethiopian
    3. 2. of it Self, (i.e. directly & not by accident) when there is an essentiall or causall connexion. This is 4 fold.
    4. 1. When the pred: is of the Def: as the Subject,

    1. 2. When the subject is of the Def: of the predicate, & so it is as property of the 4th sort for Risibility is defin’d [an affection in man arising from Rationality]
    2. 3. When existence is predicated of substance As, Socrates is; now what ever is, is necessary while it is: bec: nothing can be and not be at the same time, this kind of necessity is not of use in demonstration.

      ¶ Existence is a being of a thing actually & out of its causes; or actuated essence, as a Rose in June: Whereas essence may be in causes when it is not actuated by existence as a Rose in winter.

    3. 4. when an external cause (such are efficient & end) is predicated of its effect; as, an eclipse is the shadow of the earth.
    4. 3. as it self, when the predicate is attributed so universally, as that it is not only Reciprocated with the subject, but it is also primary in it as the Diff: So Rational in man:

    1. Risibility indeed is in man universally and Reciprocated with him, but it is in him, not primarily, but only secondarily & depending on Rationality.

    1. ¶ In these 3 degrees of necessity the 2d includes the 1st, and the 3d both the other as being most perfect.
    2. 2. Immediate


    1. 3 more knowable, so the premises must be then the conclusion, else they could not make it known.
    2. 4 Antecedent (in truth to the conclusion) for this is true from the premises, yet they from this.
    3. 5 cause of the conclusion; for the middle term must be the cause of the affection as Rationality is Risibility.

    Syn. Cap. 3.

    That, a thing is, is demonstated when the middle term (mean or principle) is

    1. 1. Either a Remote efficient cause which is either
      1. 1. Reciprocated (or turned) with the effect & then it makes a demonstration affirmative, in barbara, as

    1. 2. not Reciprocated, & then it makes only a neg: (i.e. demonstrates that the thing is not) in comestres, as

    1. ¶ that living is the cause of nourishment, the remote cause, bec: the nutritive power does Intervene: tis Reciprocated with liver, for every liver is nourished, and every nourished is a liver, but in the other case; breathing is the cause of the Animals remaining so to be; A remote cause, bec: the natural power to breath intervenes: is not Reciprocated, for thô every breather be an Animal, yet every Animal is not a breather, for fishes, flies, and other insects are not so.

    1. 2. a next effect, proving its cause, that it is, or has been in being or in the same subject so Risibility proves Rationality to be in man

    1. In like manner ashes prove that there has been fire, & so we prove that being of a Deity from the creation. Rom. 1.2029
    2. ¶ There is an [Ergò or] therefore of
    3. conseq: only which signifies no more than in that, or for as much as. cause, which signifies bec: of
    4. here in this sort of demonstration, the [Ergò] is no more than an Ergò of Conseq: As, therefore there has been fire in that (or for as much) there are ashes, not [therefore) bec: of ashes, for ashes are not the cause of fire but the effect thereof.
    5. this sort (that) is called demonstration [from the latter) bec: the effect is later than (or after) the cause; whereas the other (why) which is from the cause is called demonstration [from the former] bec: the cause does go before the effect, & this proves not only that it is, but why it is, and is the cheife demonstration.

    1. Why a thing is, is showing not only the existence, but the reason or nature of the thing: tis when the middle term or principle of demonstration is the next cause moving its effect.

    The causes of a thing

    1. 1. demonstration by matter
    2. 2. by form
    3. 3. by effect
    4. 4. By the end

    Syn. Cap. 4.

    Cap. 5

    The affections (or properties) of Demonstration are 3.

    1. 1. Analysis, which is the Resolving effects into their first and indemonstrable causes to get a perfect knowledge of them & quiet the mind: it is a Recapitulation of argument with a (bec:) instead of an (Ergò) beginning at the last urged & going back to the first, this is done commonly in the end of a disputation, & is but a sorites, with the latter end forwards. As

    1. ¶ A thing is said to be Indemonstrable
    2. 1. for want of evidence; as a falsehood.
    3. 2. from abundances of evidences

    an object of sense—as the sun shines.

    a first principle—as the whole is bigger than its parts.


    1. 2. Regresse (or a lawful Reciprocall demonstration) is when by an effect Indistinctly known, we prove its cause (that it is) & then by the same cause distinctly known, we prove the effect (why it is).

    1. It differs from a vitious circle31 which attempts to prove (a why it is) on both sides, but that is Impossible, for nothing can be the cause of that where of it is the effect: Such is the absurd popish circle about the Popes authority from the Scripture & then again the Scriptures authority from the Pope: As, why has the Scripture Authority? the Pope give it [for according to them no Scripture can be Authentick or canonical unless he allows it to be so) but how comes the Pope by this Authority? A: the Scripture gives it (thou art Peter &c)32 but that is not the sense of the place; oh yes, it must needs be so: Why? because the Pope says so, & so on in the round till you are weary of nonsense.

    Examples of a lawful regresse.

    The cause by that effect,

    Examples of a vitious circle

    the effects by the cause

    1. 3. Conversion, is a turning the demonstration finished & allowed to be good into the perfect Definition of the property demonstrated

    1. ¶ that in chapt 3d it is said that the precognition of the affection (necessary to demonstration) is only of the name, not of the thing: here the reason of it may be seen, for the thing (i.e. the Definition of the thing) cannot be known till after the demonstration be made and converted; therefore it is not necessary to be foreknown.
    2. ¶ it is said also there among the necessaries direct, the 2d sort, that the subject is of the Definition of the predicate, this is seen here in this conversion, for man the subject is part of the Definition of Risible, the predicate or affection proved.

    Syn. Cap. 5.

    Cap. 6. Of Topicall Syllogism

    A topical syllog: is that which consists of probable Propositions, begetting

    A probable assent to the conclusion

    that is probable which seems true

    As the goods of the mind33 are better than the goods of the body, Sin is worse than sickness &c.

    Probable is by all, most, wiseest, deem’d

    & then of those all, most, or most esteem’d

    The same prop:

    Things thus disputed about are called topical predicates: the middle terms that prove the predicate to belong to the subject are called the Argument.

    Arguments are found out to prove a thing probable from Logick places, called topick; hence unreasonable wicked men (2 Thess 3.2.) are (in the original) said to be without Topicks.34

    In Topicks are 2 things to be considered, maxims and differences, of maxims. 1. maxims (or axioms) generall propositions on which arguments are founded. 2. Differences of maxims, certain heads or common places under which these maxims are Ranked, & from which arguments may be drawn; As, Genus, Definition, cause, &c. thus if one would prove Logick to be an art, he may take an argument from the Def: of Art which is an habit effective &c.

    This argument is grounded on this maxim [the Definite agrees to what the Definition doth] if the Def: of Art [an habit effective &c] doth agree to Logick, then doth the Definite [Art] agree with it also.


    Places (or topicks) are either

    1. 1. Artificial, such as are drawn forth by Art, those are Reduced to 7 pair, as cause & causate, Subject & adjunct, &c.
    2. 2. Inartificial, is drawn forth without art; tis onely one, Testimony.

    Of the Artificial.

    1. 1. cause & causate is a place or topick from whence arguments (or mediums) are drawn which are either the cause or the effect of the thing to be proved. Its maxims are:
      1. 1. every cause is before its causate

    1. so it must be (one way or other) bec: every effect depends on its cause.
    2. 2. The cause being put, or granted to be, the effect is put (or necessarily follows thereon) & on the contrary; Remove the cause and you remove the effect: provided the cause be.
      1. 1. total not partial; As, the Sun being above the Horizon, it is day.
      2. 2. of it self, or direct, (& not by Accident) A Physitian heals directly, a musitian36 by Accident.
      3. 3. next, not remote; as, the heat of fire, (remote) burns when nigh[t] (next)
    3. 3. an efficient gives not what it has not, that is

    1. 1. formally, as an unlearned man cannot do a learned excercise. or
    2. 2. virtually, So god gives matter that has none formally in him bec: he has it virtually (or in his power to produce) So the Sun gives fruits althô it has none formally in it.
    3. 4. as is the cause, such is the effect, provided

    1. 1. the cause be universall: as man begetts a man; a lyon a lyon.
    2. 2. the effect be like in essentialls (but not in all accidentalls) So a Learned man may have a fool to his Son, a blind father A Seeing Son.

      ¶ those are not all the maxims of cause that may be found in

    1. Logick writers, nor are they all mentioned in the other topicks that follow, but the Instances on every place are the cheif. I can at present think of, & may suffice to direct how to use maxims, & give them the due limitations.
    2. 2. Subject & adjunct is a topick &c (as in cause changing only what is to be changed, & so the rest that follow) Its maxims are.
      1. 1. Subjects are demonstrated by the Accidents (or adjuncts) As, fire is called hot from the heat in it.
      2. 2. demonstration is taken from the cheif part; As, a man may be said to be good or wise tho there be of the contrary in him; & so a wicked man thô he do some good.

    1. 3. the Subject being put, the adjunct is put, & on the contrary, i.e. if the adjunct be proper & Inseparable, not a common Acci: & separable from the subject.
    2. 3. disagreeing & compared of which
      1. 1. disagreeing are

    1. 2. compared

    1. Its maxims are
    2. 1. the better, the good the worse, its contrary, as if virtue be better than riches, then vice is worse than poverty.

    1. 2. opposites have the same Reason both in respect of
      1. 1. knowledge for one dos illustrate the other; so, to know what sickness is, we must know what health is; & è contrà.
      2. 2. Subject, for they are conversant both about the same subject, so, are health and sickness in Respect of humane Body.

    1. 3. if 2 things are equall, what is equall to one of them is equall to the other; as a line of a foot long being equal to a foot Rule another line that is a foot long is equall to either of them.

    1. 4. no like is the same, for likeness is a Relation between divers things: so Alchymy (or fictitious gold) is no gold, bec: it but Resembles it, and so blanched copper does silver.

    1. 5. love from a likeness; So good men love good, bad men bad company; and therefore (says fuller Ingeniously) a mans companion is a comment on the margin of his life, whereby another man maybe read & understand the text of his secret Inclinations.

    1. 4. conjugates & notations, Whereof.
      1. 1. conjugates are words of like signification & derivation,

    1. therefore if Soc: has learning, he is learned & can do Learnedly.
    2. 2. notation is the explication of a word by its Etymology; As a Prophet is one that foretells future things; for Prophet comes from a word that signifies to forspeak. Maxims are
      1. 1. To whom one of the conjugates do agree to him dos the other also, et è contrà. Tis fallacious


    1. But the contrary: viz: from act to power is very good; as he laughs, Ergò he is Risible.

    1. 2. if one conjugate be said of one conjugate, then the other is said of the other; As, if red be coloured, then Redness is a colour; if covetousness be a vice, then a covetous man is vitious.

    1. 3. to whom the notation agrees, to him the thing noted also agrees; as he foretells future things, Ergò he is a Prophet.

      ¶ tis fallacious when the Etymologies are foolish & unApt: as, phantastick comes from a word that signifies light; E. he that so calls a Quaker grants him to have his pretended light within him.38

    1. 5. Whole & parts. maxims are.
      1. 1. the whole is more than the part, i.e. in the same Respect, wherein it is a whole, for otherwise it may be false: for Animal as A whole (universall) is more than man bec: it comprehends both man and beast; yet the same Animal as a part (essentiall) of the same man is less than man, for man as a whole comprehends both Animal & Rational.

    1. 2. the parts being put, the whole is put; i.e. all the parts taken together & united; else, he that Returneth all the torn peices of my book may be said to restore my borrowed book: he returns indeed all that he borrowed but not the whole that he borrowed.

    1. 3. parts are for the whole; so, particular churches are for the universal: particular corporations for the commonwealth, for whose good somtimes they must part with their conveniences, better an hand cut of;39 or an eye plucked out tha{n} the whole man perish.40

    1. 6. Genus and Species. maxims are.
      1. 1. take away the genus and you take away the species; not on the contrary; as, if there be no animal, before there is no man; but if there be no man yet there may be An Animal: and by the same reason it holds as to Species and Individualls; for if there be no body in a place then {John} is not there.

    1. 2. of what the species is predicated, of the same is the genus; but not on the contrary: as, if Socrates be A man he is an Animal, but a horse may be an Animal yet it follows not that he is a man, for genus and Species will not convert.

    1. 7. Definition and division. maxims are.
      1. 1. Whatever is Defined is a species; i.e. perfectly defined by Genus and Diff: for highest genus and Individualls have no genus which is required to a perfect Definition therefore they are only described as they may be.

    1. 2. to what the Definition dos agree to the same dos the definite; As, if Socrates be a Risible living creature (the Definition of man) then Socrates is a man: the Definite by the Definition.

    1. 3. every division must be of two members only; bec: the members should be opposite, now opposition is between two: this must be observed for accurateness, if it can be so conveniently without overmuch multiplication of distinctions: but in popular discourses men usually take a greater latitude.

    These are the Artificial Topics; The Inartificial which draws forth arguments without Art is only one, namely Testimony: saying it is so for he said so.

    1. Its maxims are.
    2. 1. To Divine Testimony we must give certain and universall credit, bec: God can neither deceive (from his truth) nor be deceived (from his omniscience.)
    3. 2. humane testimonies are according to the credit of their Authors: honest and wise men are most credible: knaves and fools may well be suspected.

    1. 3. humane testimonies cannot be Infallible yet they may be indubitable; as when they are universall and uncontrol’d; when the testifier has had opportunity enough to know and no Interest to byas from the truth then it is reasonably supposed that he is neither deceived nor a deceiver, whence we see besides the Testimony at least a Reason not to disbelieve it; so that the force of this lies more in the reason than in the Testimony.

      Such Indubitable Testimonies or traditions are, that there is such a city as Paris or Rome; that there were such men as Alexander, Cæsar &c. which I may undoubtedly believe thô I never saw the one or the other.

    1. 4. skilfull men are to be believed in their art; i.e. unless contradicted by
      1. 1. men more skillfull in that art.

    1. 2. a mans own sense or Reason.
    2. 5. one Scripture is worth 10 arguments, and one Argument is worth 10 humane Testimonies;41 for in arguments our Reasons being weak and corrupted may deceive us, yet reason is to be preferred before humane Testimonies, bec: we must always use a Judgment of discretion and walk by our own light (gods candle in us) and not by others; therefore the Romanists Implicit faith is foolish & absurd, seeing our reason must Judge if the Testimony be credible.

    1. ¶ that maxims are aright and good ground of argument when rightly understood & applyed; therefore bounding of maxims by distinctions answers fallacious arguments pretending to be grounded in them, and therefore all disputes arise from misapplying maxims.

    Syn. cap. 6.


    Cap. 7. Of Fallacies.

    Fallacy (or Sophism) is a syllog: that from fallacious premises collects a false conclusion so beget deceit, handled

    ¶ some think this chapter superfluous, bec: it is forestalled by the foregoing præcepts, which if well observed we need not fear a fallacy, however the Antients thought fit, and custome has confirmed the treating of fallacies distinctly by themselves (besides what is before noted) that the learner may better discern and avoid them, there is one generall rule to discover fallacies: viz: all fallacies have 4 terms, or a double mean, i.e. when the middle term is otherwise taken in the minor proposition then it was in the major. The kinds of fallacies Reckoned by Aristotle are 13

    1. 1. In the words are 6 Topicks or places for fallacy.
      1. 1. Equivocation when a word is taken ambiguously that is in one sense in the major & another in the minor

    1. 2. Amphiboly is Equivocation

    1. 3. composition when taken conjoyned that should be taken

    divided, as

    1. 4. division on the contrary,

    1. 5. likeness of sound in 2 distinct words

    1. 6. figure of a word, when from likeness of the words is argued that the grammaticall notions belong to both,

    1. ¶ that all these fallacies are rather merriments, than cheats, being easily answered by distinquishing on the words; but those that follow deserve better consideration.

    1. 2. out of the words, and in the sense of them.
      1. 1. of an Accident adjoyn’d in the minor, not intended or thought on in the major; thence that will seem to belong to a thing of it self which is only


    1. 2. from a Respective saying to an absolute; when that which is only true in some respect, is taken as if absolute true.

    1. 3. Ignorance Imposed on, when one thinks through Ignorance, that he is contradicted when he is not

    1. ¶ our saviour used this not as a fallacy, but as an enigma to supress their Insolence: he proposed to them a difficulty wherein they could not and he would not satisfie them.
    2. 4. not cause for cause, when something is offered as a cause which either is

    1. Ans: wine either
    2. 1. is not the cause, but rather Inordinate Appetite, which indeed must be destroyed.
    3. 2. not such a cause as must be destroyed: it is only Instrumentall and may be otherwise honestly used.

    1. 5. bad conseq: when something seems to follow which indeed dos not,

    1. Answered by bringing the prop: to the rules of conversion; for thô every ass be an Animal, yet every Animal is not an ass & so the double medium dos Appear; for Animal in one Prop: is the genus, and in the other it signifies but one of the species, which it ought not, bec: (as is before noted) the medium must always be taken in the same sense and latitude in both the premises: else, thô but the same word, yet it is two mediums, there is another sort of bad conseq: here usually mention’d when things will not hang together,

    1. 6. begging the question, when to prove a conclusion, that is taken for granted, as a principle which is æqually doubted, or denyed,

    1. It is answered by denying the supposed principle.

    1. 7. captious (or Implicated) Interrogations (or questions) when divers things some true, some false are packed together in one question, so that if you grant or deny it in the lump either will be against truth. As is not the world perfect and eternal. Ans: by separating and then granting or denying each part, as it deserves, the world is perfect but not eternal.

    1. ¶ all fallacies are comprehended in these two memorial lines, which for memories sake are made to run like a pair of Latin verses.

    Equiv: Am: comp: Div: like sound, & figure of words

    Acci: Respective, Ignor: cause, con: beg: and infer:

    Syn. Cap. 7.

    Cap. 8. Of Method

    Method is such a disposition of the parts of a discipline (or discourse) that the whole may be better Learned (i.e. understood & retained) by us.

    Method is 2 fold, of Invention and of Teaching.

    1. 1. Method of Invention is, whereby by the precepts of a discipline are at first found out, and the canons and rules thereof setled.

      Its proceeding is

    1. ¶ Universalls are more knowable in themselves (or nature) bec: they can be defin’d, whereas singulars can only be described.

    1. I have seeing, observed and had experience that this heavy descends, & that that heavy descends, and that the other heavy descends, and so all the rest (for ought I know) therefore I conclude and settle this as a general rule, viz: every heavy descends. This was the method whereby learned men in former ages have found out Arts & Sciences for us, we having by their Industry gotten a shorter way to knowledge.

    1. But if after experience, or better observation which say the Aintients were mistaken, tis lawfull to make new experiments, and settle new rules.

    1. 2. method of Teaching & learning proceeds from Intelligibles & more universalls to less universalls & sensibles. as, from generalls to specialls to Individuals (if need be) but generally, sciences go no further down than the species & leave us to apply it to the Individuals.

    This method is twofold.

    1. 1. Synthetick (or composing) method begins with the subject of a discipline in general, than the principles of the subject, next the generall affections (or properties) & then descends to the severall species thereof.

      ¶ principles

    1. In this method are handled all theoretick & speculative sciences, such as metaphysicks, pneumaticks, physick, mathematicks.

    1. 2. Analytick (or Resolving) method begins with the end proceeds to the subject (for whose sake the end is looked after) and concludes with the means whereby that end is attainable, in this method are handled all practicall & operative disciplines. Such are prudences & arts, As, ethicks, politics, ceconomics, Logick, Rhetorick, & architecture &c. Rules of Method are

    1. 1. Generall rules are. 5.
      1. 1. nothing in a discipline must be wanting or Redundant.
      2. 2. all parts must agree and not cross each other.

    1. 3. nothing must be handled but what is homogeneal, i.e. of the same kind with subject or end.

    1. 4. that must procede which may help the knowledge of what follows, and may in good part be understood without it.
    2. 5. every part should have apt terminations that the connexion of antecedents and consequents may appear.

    1. ¶ that these rules being observed will much conduce to a clear & distinct apprehension, & thereby to a Rational memory: children & fools may retain words without connexion: but men whose dryer & more compacted brains (which are thereby better fitted for wisdom) have need of some methodicall frame, to hold things together and make A joynt Impression on their thoughts: hereby they shall better command their notions and draw forth one thing by another in the way of Ratiocination; some define Logick the Art of memory, and hence it is needfull that all people of business (in what kind soever) should be methodical therein.
    2. 2. Speciall rules of method peculiar to each kind are.
      1. 1. to Synthetick 3

    1. 2. to Analytick 3

    Syn. cap. 8.


    And thus we have gone through Logick in the easiest manner I can at present Imagine. Claubergius44 a learned man advises the reading of a book 3 times. 1st that you may have a more generall notion. 2 that you may more distinctly judge of it. 3. that you may retain it. I have endeavoured so to order this discourse that every chapter shall be (in effect) 3 times read.45 1. in prose. 2. in verses memorial 3. in schemes; and by that time all are read distinctly and considerable; I hope the chapter will be fully understood. nor let any be discouraged at the hard words and many distinctions in Log: for if you can but well conquer this, all other arts and sciences will be easy.

    upon the prickly bush of logic grows

    of other sciences the fragrant rose.—