The first page (p. 151) of Quincy’s maxim collection in volume four of the Law Reports, P347, Reel 4, QP 58. See Cox Chart, Appendix II, infra. The page is entitled “Maxims of the Civil Law” and offers a careful, neatly compiled list of Roman law maxims in a fairly even hand. Following the title, Quincy cross-references another collection of maxims in volume three of his Law Reports, as well as another section within volume four discussing ecclesiastical and civil law. The first maxim is the focus of a footnote at the bottom, set off from the main text by a line scored across the page. The note, an excerpt from Wood’s Civil Law, continues on the following page. My thanks to Elizabeth Papp Kamali. Reproduced courtesy of Massachusetts Historical Society.

QUINCY’S LATIN LEGAL MAXIMS

Translator’s Note and Introduction

Elizabeth Papp Kamali*

Ch. Just. Have you no Authorities, Gentlemen?

Mr. Gridley. There is no Authority that the Sun shines.

Mr. Auchmuty. But there is Evidence.1

By the early twentieth century, a scholar could assert, without controversy, that the “principal service performed by the average maxim is … to bolster or support a legal viewpoint rather than to decide a case.”2 In Quincy’s time, however, reception of English law was an ongoing process, domestic precedents were not systematically recorded, and American lawyers were taking tentative steps toward defining the weight of various authorities in the colonial courtroom. The exchange quoted above, excerpted from a case recorded by Quincy in his Law Reports, was followed shortly by quotation of a maxim, although the ensuing conversation touched upon a variety of authorities.3 A maxim could carry considerable weight when, for example, the English common law provided a contradictory or unsatisfactory answer. Representing principles that transcend time and space, maxims offered the colonial American lawyer a fresh outlook on perplexing legal questions and a broad framework within which to weigh the merits of either side of an action. Regretfully, Quincy’s early death, which brought his legal career to an abrupt close, precludes a study of his maxim collection in action. Undoubtedly, with his meticulously cross-referenced arsenal of maxims, Josiah Quincy Jr. would have been a dynamo in the courtroom.

Josiah Quincy Jr.’s collection of Latin legal maxims comprises twenty-two pages within two volumes of his Law Reports.4 In volume four, six pages of maxims, entitled “Maxims of the Civil Law” (referred to here as Maxim I), are followed by four blank pages and twenty-four pages of miscellaneous notes on evidence and other legal topics.5 The first of two sets of maxims in volume three is entitled “Maxims & Rules of the Law” (Maxim II).6 Oddly, seven blank pages precede the next set of maxim pages (Maxim III), entitled “Maxims, etc.” Quincy evidently conceived of these as three distinct maxim collections. In both volumes, Quincy’s placement of the maxims toward the end of the book suggests that they may have been viewed as an appendix to the law reports; alternatively, the blank pages available after the Law Reports may have simply been a convenient locale for situating the maxims. Regardless, Quincy’s use of distinct titles for the three separate groupings of maxim pages, while possibly inconsequential, is likely indicative of some schematic vision, perhaps divisible into Roman law (Maxim I), broad principles of law (Maxim II), and maxims dealing with particular substantive legal topics (Maxim III).7 Unfortunately, Quincy’s heavy reliance on Edward Coke in compiling both Maxim II and Maxim III stymie any conclusive effort to differentiate between these two sets of maxims.

All three groupings of maxim pages are written in the same hand, with a large underscored title at the top of each page. Structurally, however, the three sets of maxims differ somewhat. For example, neat organization characterizes the Roman law section in Maxim I, with indentations for each maxim and a separate footnote section at the bottom of some pages.8 Maxim III evokes chaos by contrast, with maxims penned in script ranging from miniscule to large, most likely due to the addition of maxims at later points.9 Furthermore, Quincy employs marginal footnotes to add extensive citation references in Maxim III, sometimes combining alphabetical footnotes with symbols when incorporating a combination of internal and external references or, perhaps, when adding further citations at a later time, thereby disrupting the original alphabetical scheme.10 On one page, Quincy started with the letter b for his first footnote and proceeded next to d, apparently leaving out letters a and c in the anticipation of adding more footnotes later on.11 Quincy’s listing of citations was a work in progress, a reference to which he added further sources over time. He also added maxims at later points, as demonstrated by the fact that some maxims are sandwiched in, penned in a smaller hand, between two other maxims.12 Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine whether the three sets of maxims were compiled simultaneously or at different times, which might explain some of these differences in format.

A few clues hint at Quincy’s method in assembling the maxims and footnotes. Quincy’s references are almost entirely impeccable. When I have run into difficulty tracking down a source, the problem has almost always revolved around my failure to access a particular edition or to recognize at first that Quincy was not citing to an explicit quotation of a maxim, but instead to a more generalized discussion of a related topic. On one occasion where Quincy did provide an erroneous page number, however, I discovered that Coke’s index of maxims (located toward the end of his volume of Reports) provided the same incorrect page number. In this instance, Quincy may have copied the page number, and perhaps the maxim itself, from Coke’s maxim index, rather than accessing the maxim within the body of Coke’s text.13 At the same time, it is possible that Quincy employed a secondary source of maxims and citations, such as a fellow law scholar’s commonplace book, and that this source, in turn, repeated the erroneous page number from Coke’s list. Similarly, one of Quincy’s Roman law maxims has a closer analogue in Coke’s Institutes than in the Digest citation provided by Quincy, suggesting that Quincy was not referencing a copy of Justinian directly but was instead getting his maxims from another source.14 Thus, Quincy may not have been simply paging through Coke’s Institutes, Justinian’s Digest, and other cited texts in search of maxim material, but may have relied instead, at least in part, on other sources.

Quincy’s maxims are largely a study of Coke, and his reliance on Coke may have extended to questions of format as well. Some editions of Coke’s Reports display a similarly heavy use of marginal citation notes, employing essentially the same format as that used by Quincy.15 What was the purpose behind these extensive references to Coke and various reporters? Quincy’s careful work in compiling his commonplace book and multiple volumes of law reports seems to rule out an idiosyncratic obsession with compiling lists of citations. The sheer number of marginal citations suggests also that these maxim lists were not merely a memory aid or study guide, in which case a single citation, or perhaps none at all, would have sufficed. Rather, Quincy likely intended to employ these maxim lists actively in devising legal arguments. Perhaps a maxim with several citations carried greater legal weight in his estimation than one which appeared only once in Coke’s Reports. Or perhaps the citations were a means to accessing more extensive supporting material to illuminate the possible application of a particular maxim.16

Several examples illustrate Quincy’s plan for using the maxims. Quincy glossed one maxim with a footnote indicating that exceptions to the maxim’s rule were possible in cases where otherwise “an inconvenience should follow.”17 In another instance, Quincy qualified a maxim describing custom as the best interpreter of laws with the comment that custom may sometimes prevail against a statute.18 He traced this maxim to two sources: one regarding a slander action, and the other discussing the interpretation of charters. Perhaps Quincy viewed the maxims as general propositions of law that could be applied to a variety of causes of action, and his references were an aid to help him track down relevant material to cite in court. In another instance, Quincy referenced a source stating a proposition contrary to that communicated by the maxim itself.19 After recording the familiar maxim that a personal action dies with the person, Quincy cited to Nelson’s Lex Testamentaria with a note-to-self indicating that the referenced text describes how the maxim is “extended & limited.”20 This sophisticated gloss suggests that Quincy likely intended his maxims to serve as a reference to be used in practice, perhaps both for constructing legal arguments and for anticipating potential contrary arguments. This was not a rudimentary index of maxims, but a complex study of legal principles and their limitations.

While Quincy did separate his maxims into three distinct groupings,21 he did not use the same precision in categorizing them as he did, for example, in dividing his commonplace book into distinct topical headings. Broadly speaking, Maxim I cited propositions from Roman law sources. Maxim II dealt in matters pertaining to lawsuits and the administration of justice. This section may have been compiled by Quincy with an eye toward use in the courtroom, where persuasive rhetoric might have employed general statements about law and justice. Maxim III, by contrast, dealt more with the nuts and bolts of what we would today categorize as property law, contracts, testaments, and evidence. Clearly this overlaps with the concept of Maxim II, but the goal here may have been to dig deeper into specific questions of law, rather than speaking of law in its more abstract and general sense.

My translation of Josiah Quincy Jr.’s collection of Latin legal maxims involved close work with the manuscript22 but was aided tremendously by the earlier work undertaken by two other research assistants: Michael H. Hayden, who prepared an initial transcription, and Susannah B. Tobin, who commenced a translation of the maxims and took time out of her busy clerkship schedule to acquaint me with the project. In addition to Tobin’s work, I relied on the Perseus on-line Latin reference,23 my dog-eared copy of Lewis & Short,24 and the various sources cited by Quincy, which often helped clarify the meaning of an otherwise ambiguous maxim.25 When a maxim could lend itself to a more literal or classical translation, as opposed to a “legalistic” paraphrasing, I have erred in favor of the former. In some instances, I have footnoted alternative translations from Latin for Lawyers26 or some other maxim reference book. My final task was to decipher the multitude of textual citations provided by Quincy and to track down his sources27 with the hope of determining why Quincy ever undertook this maxim collection in the first place. I hope the ensuing pages of translated maxims will provide some conclusions.

I should add a note on using the facing pages of Latin and English translation to follow. Generally, footnotes on the left-hand Latin page highlight oddities in the manuscript or, in some cases, alternative phrasings of the maxims as provided in Quincy’s referenced sources. The footnotes on the right-hand page, on the other hand, primarily set out Quincy’s citations in full detail, rendering “3 Rep. 40.a.”, for instance, into “Sir Edward Coke, Reports, part 3 (ist French edition, 1602; ist English edition, 1658), 40.a (Ratcliff’s Case).” As in the above example, references have been fleshed out, wherever practicable, to include chapter headings or other identifying section titles. Where a citation is provided with no additional parenthetical explanation beyond a section title, as above, the reader may assume that the maxim quoted by Quincy was quoted directly in the source. However, where parentheticals are provided and do not expressly indicate that the maxim was quoted, the reader should assume that the maxim was not directly quoted in the source. In many cases, particularly in his marginal footnotes, Quincy referenced texts not for their direct quotation of a maxim but for their discussion of a related legal topic.

In compiling his maxim collection, Josiah Quincy Jr. recognized what Chancellor Kent would declare nearly a century later: “There are scarcely any maxims in the English law but what were derived from the Romans.”28 Perhaps this explains why, on the pages immediately following the curriculum recommended by Professor Francis Dickins at Cambridge, Quincy commenced a collection of excerpts almost exclusively derived from Justinian’s Digest. Aside from footnoting related discourses from Wood’s Civil Law to gloss three of the maxims, Quincy presented his “Maxims of the Civil Law,” as he titled the collection, with only a single citation per maxim. It would appear that these maxims, as suggested by Lord Coke, were propositions “to be of all men confessed and granted without proofe, argument, or discourse.”29 Quincy may have viewed these Roman law maxims as propositions which could stand on their own and, to quote Bacon, which could be “delivered to more several purposes and applications” accordingly.30 Yet Quincy did not entirely adopt Bacon’s approach toward maxims; whereas Bacon favored the delivery “of knowledge in distinct and disjoined aphorisms,” so as to “leave the wit of man more free to turn and toss,”31 Quincy appears to have grouped his civil law maxims into distinct legal categories, to which the modern reader might apply the titles interpretation of law,32 the use of precedent,33 wills and testaments,34 contracts,35 and criminal law.36 This suggests that Quincy pinned the Roman law maxims to a specific substantive context beyond which they should not be too broadly construed.

In another volume of Law Reports,37 Quincy compiled a separate list of maxims entitled “Maxims & Rules of the Law,” comprising a mere three pages.38 This collection has a loose thematic scheme that revolves largely around the general topic of law, lawsuits, and justice.39 For this selection of maxims, Quincy relied heavily on Coke’s Institutes, while also drawing aphorisms from a range of other sources, including Fitzherbert’s Natura Brevium, Salkeld’s and Coke’s Reports, Plowden’s Commentaries, and the Abridgements of both Lilly and Bacon. In contrast to the Roman law maxims, which could sometimes be compartmentalized into substantive categories as specific as contracts or criminal law, these maxims tend to offer broader legal principles. It may be for this reason that Quincy chose the title “Maxims & Rules,” perhaps viewing the two terms as distinct. In this regard, Quincy’s thinking would be aligned with that of John Dodderidge, who distinguished between ‘primary principles’, or maxims, and ‘secondary principles’, or rules.40 From Dodderidge’s perspective, rules are ‘not so well known by the light of nature … and are peculiarly known for the most part, to such only as profess the study and the speculation of the law.’41 By contrast, Coke had little patience for distinguishing among maxims, principles, rules, postulates, or axioms, observing that “it were too much curiosity to make nice distinctions between them.”42 While it is possible to read too much into Quincy’s choice of heading, I believe that he took a view of maxims and rules more akin to Dodderidge than Coke in this respect; this might help to explain Quincy’s decision to compile three separate collections of maxims.

Coke also opined that “it is well said in our books … nest my a disputer l ancient principles del ley.”43 Quincy was not so deferential. In his third collection of maxims, a collection entitled “Maxims, etc.” and separated from “Maxims & Rules” by seven blank pages, Quincy engages the maxims, tests their limits, expands upon their applications, proffers examples, and cites to multiple sources. Lord Esher would observe over a century later that maxims “are almost invariably misleading: they are for the most part so large and general in their language that they always include something which really is not intended to be included in them.”44 Quincy’s view was not so extreme, but he did recognize limits upon the appropriate application of certain maxims. For example, he notes that “Verba accipienda sunt cum Effectu” is a maxim that “holds good in Statutes.”45 Perhaps the maxim, in his view, should not be applied as readily to interpreting contracts or testaments. Similarly, Quincy cites to Coke’s Institutes for guidance as to how the maxim, “Quolibet Concessio fortissime contra Donatorem interpretanda est” should be understood.46 In another instance, he quotes the maxim “Res inter Alios acta, alteri nocere non debet” but cites to “an exception to this Max.” in Coke’s Institutes.47 In glossing the maxims in this manner, Quincy followed Bacon’s example. In his Maximes, Bacon listed the rule, described it and the policy behind it, offered examples, and then turned to limitations or exceptions.48 While not tackling each maxim as systematically as Bacon, or limiting his maxims to a more manageable number, Quincy nevertheless had a similar respect for the depth of information a single maxim could contain. At the same time, Quincy recognized that maxims could be applied erroneously, thereby exposing an uncautious lawyer’s argument to attack.

This third maxim collection is almost entirely attributable to Coke, both the Institutes and the Reports, with a few rare exceptions such as Bulstrode and Salkeld’s Reports, Hawkins’s Abridgment, and Saint German’s Doctor & Student. In fact, of a total of 147 maxims in this collection, a mere six have a primary citation other than to Coke.49 The maxims are loosely arranged by topic, ranging from property law and interpretation of charters,50 to criminal law51 and evidence.52 I believe that this collection of maxims was designed for active use in Quincy’s legal practice, and that the multiple citations were a means for the young lawyer to bolster his maxim-based arguments with specific examples and nuanced interpretations.

postscript

How grateful I am to Professor Daniel R. Coquillette for introducing me to the world of Josiah Quincy Jr., a name only vaguely familiar to me previously in connection with his son, former President of Harvard College. As a budding historian, I take careful note of Prof. Coquillette’s academic style, and I have been impressed by the sensitivity, lighthearted wit, and profound respect with which he has approached the subject of this series. In Prof. Coquillette’s office at Harvard Law School, a copy of Gilbert Stuart’s portrait of Josiah Quincy Jr. holds a conspicuous place of honor on the wall, an ever-present reminder of the brilliant young man whose legacy Prof. Coquillette has done so much to promote. I am deeply grateful to Prof. Coquillette for including me in the task of illuminating this portrait of a patriot, and for offering generous guidance, patient mentorship, and an admirable example.

THEMES AND SOURCES IN QUINCY’S MAXIMS

Page Total # of Maxims Main Themes1 Main Sources (# maxims); fn = footnote; only first listed source recorded Observations
    MAXIMS I (“Maxims of the Civil Law”)    

151

8

Interpretation of Law (8)

Justinian’s Digest (7)

Justinian’s Code (1)

Wood’s Civil Law (fn)

Roman law sources. Clear theme throughout.

152

6

Interpretation of Law (6)

Justinian’s Digest (6)

Wood’s Civil Law (fn)

Roman law source. Clear theme throughout.

153

6

Precedent (4)

Interpretation of Law/Judgment (2)

Justinian’s Digest (6)

Wood’s Civil Law (fn)

Roman law source.

154

10

Wills & Testaments (5)

Contracts (5)

Justinian’s Digest (9)

Justinian’s Code (1)

Roman law sources.

155

10

Contracts (6)

Criminal Law (3)

Interpretation of Law/Judgment (1)

Justinian’s Digest (9)

Justinian’s Code (1)

Wood’s Civil Law (fn)

Roman law sources.

156

4

Criminal Law (4)

Justinian’s Digest (4)

Roman law source. Lower half of page blank.

    MAXIMS II (“Maxims &Rules of the Law”)    

161

13

Law, Lawsuits, and Justice (12)

Property (1)

Coke, Institutes (11)

Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium (1)

Salkeld’s Reports (1)

 

162

7

Law, Lawsuits, and Justice (7)

Coke, Reports (2)

Coke, Institutes (1)

Salkeld’s Reports (1)

Nelson (1)

Lilly’s Abridgment (1)

Bacon’s Abridgment (1)

Theme appears to be lawsuits in general, with some reference to principles of law. Greater variety of sources.

163

2

Interpretation of Law (1)

Precedent (1)

Plowden, Commentaries (1)

Justinian’s Digest (1)

Most of page left blank.

  MAXIMS III (“Maxims, etc.”)    

171

13

Property (4)

Interpretation of Law (3)

Custom (3)

Precedent (2)

Natural Law (1)

Coke, Institutes (7)

Coke, Reports (4)

Bulstrode (1)

Salkeld (1)

Quincy packs in maxims on this page and seems to add some later, writing them interlineally. Also introduces elaborate footnoting system to record additional citations.

172

14

Interpretation of Law (6)

Property/Misc. (8)2

Coke, Institutes (11)

Coke, Reports (3)

More difficult to discern a theme. Elaborate marginal footnotes.

174

12

Property/Interpretation of Charters (11)

Actions of Court Officers (1)

Coke, Institutes (8)

Coke, Reports (4)

Difficult to find a theme at first glance, but the references to Coke are primarily to matters regarding property law. Quincy has packed in the maxims, added some later, and filled the margins with footnoted citations.

174

9

Property/Interpretation of Charters (9)

Coke, Reports (5)

Coke, Institutes (4)

Marginal footnotes.

175

10

Property/Interpretation of Charters (10)

Coke, Institutes (5)

Coke, Reports (4)

Saint German, Doctor & Student (1)

Marginal footnotes.

176

8

Property/Interpretation of Charters (8)

Coke, Institutes (5)

Coke, Reports (3)

Marginal footnotes.

177

13

Criminal Law/Deceit (10)

Property (3)

Coke, Institutes (5)

Coke, Reports (6)

Bacon, Abridgment (1)

Bracton (1)

A fairly clear theme. Marginal footnotes.

178

13

Criminal Law (11)

Misc (2)

Coke, Institutes (7)

Coke, Reports (6)

A clear theme! Marginal footnotes.

179

12

Interpretation of Statements & Actions/Slander (12)

Coke, Reports (7)

Coke, Institutes (5)

Marginal footnotes.

180

10

Proof & Evidence (8)

Law, Lawsuits, & Justice (2)

Coke, Institutes (8)

Coke, Reports (2)

Clear theme. Marginal footnotes.

181

14

Interpretation of Law (7)

Criminal Law (5)

Property Law (2)

Coke, Institutes (13)

Coke, Reports (1)

Marginal footnotes.

182

11

Wills & Testaments (2)

Interpretation of Statements & Actions/Slander (1)

Property/Misc (8)

Coke, Institutes (10)

Hawkins, Abridgment (1)

Very difficult to discern a theme. Marginal footnotes.

183

8

Criminal Law (4)

Law, Lawsuits, & Justice (4)

Coke, Institutes (8)

Marginal footnotes.